Congress passed the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) in 1977 to eliminate abusive collection practices by third party debt collectors and to ensure that those debt collectors who refrain from using abusive practices are not competitively disadvantaged. The FDCPA spells out prohibited collection practices and behavior, and creates a civil process by which consumers and enforcement offices can seek remedy.
On this page, we’ve compiled some of the most important resources for debt collectors, debt buyers, collection attorneys, and now, creditors who must all comply with the provisions of the FDCPA. These resources include annual reports, enforcement actions, case law, regulatory opinions and guidance, and much more. Please email email@example.com if you have any suggestions for the page.
Congressional Research Service Report on FDCPA (April 2013) – A succinct, plain-language interpretation of the provisions of the FDCPA, produced by an attorney for the official legislative research service of Congress.
CFPB’s Latest FDCPA Annual Report to Congress (March 2015) – Required by the law, the agency in charge of enforcing the FDCPA must make annual reports to Congress. This now falls on the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB).
FTC’s Latest FDCPA Enforcement Letter to the CFPB (February 2015) – Although the CFPB is the main regulator of the debt collection industry under the FDCPA, the FTC still has authority to launch enforcement actions. Each year, the FTC provides a letter to the CFPB detailing actions it took under the FDCPA.
Full Text of the FDCPA
United States Code, 2012 Edition
Title 15 - COMMERCE AND TRADE
CHAPTER 41 - CONSUMER CREDIT PROTECTION
SUBCHAPTER V - DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES
From the U.S. Government Printing Office, www.gpo.gov
SUBCHAPTER V—DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES
§1692. Congressional findings and declaration of purpose
(a) Abusive practices
There is abundant evidence of the use of abusive, deceptive, and unfair debt collection practices by many debt collectors. Abusive debt collection practices contribute to the number of personal bankruptcies, to marital instability, to the loss of jobs, and to invasions of individual privacy.
(b) Inadequacy of laws
Existing laws and procedures for redressing these injuries are inadequate to protect consumers.
(c) Available non-abusive collection methods
Means other than misrepresentation or other abusive debt collection practices are available for the effective collection of debts.
(d) Interstate commerce
Abusive debt collection practices are carried on to a substantial extent in interstate commerce and through means and instrumentalities of such commerce. Even where abusive debt collection practices are purely intrastate in character, they nevertheless directly affect interstate commerce.
It is the purpose of this subchapter to eliminate abusive debt collection practices by debt collectors, to insure that those debt collectors who refrain from using abusive debt collection practices are not competitively disadvantaged, and to promote consistent State action to protect consumers against debt collection abuses.
(Pub. L. 90–321, title VIII, §802, as added Pub. L. 95–109, Sept. 20, 1977, 91 Stat. 874.)
Pub. L. 90–321, title VIII, §819, formerly §818, as added Pub. L. 95–109, Sept. 20, 1977, 91 Stat. 883, §818; renumbered §819, Pub. L. 109–351, title VIII, §801(a)(1), Oct. 13, 2006, 120 Stat. 2004, provided that: “This title [enacting this subchapter] takes effect upon the expiration of six months after the date of its enactment [Sept. 20, 1977], but section 809 [section 1692g of this title] shall apply only with respect to debts for which the initial attempt to collect occurs after such effective date.”
This subchapter known as the “Fair Debt Collection Practices Act”, see Short Title note set out under section 1601 of this title.
As used in this subchapter—
(1) The term “Bureau” means the Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection.
(2) The term “communication” means the conveying of information regarding a debt directly or indirectly to any person through any medium.
(3) The term “consumer” means any natural person obligated or allegedly obligated to pay any debt.
(4) The term “creditor” means any person who offers or extends credit creating a debt or to whom a debt is owed, but such term does not include any person to the extent that he receives an assignment or transfer of a debt in default solely for the purpose of facilitating collection of such debt for another.
(5) The term “debt” means any obligation or alleged obligation of a consumer to pay money arising out of a transaction in which the money, property, insurance, or services which are the subject of the transaction are primarily for personal, family, or household purposes, whether or not such obligation has been reduced to judgment.
(6) The term “debt collector” means any person who uses any instrumentality of interstate commerce or the mails in any business the principal purpose of which is the collection of any debts, or who regularly collects or attempts to collect, directly or indirectly, debts owed or due or asserted to be owed or due another. Notwithstanding the exclusion provided by clause (F) of the last sentence of this paragraph, the term includes any creditor who, in the process of collecting his own debts, uses any name other than his own which would indicate that a third person is collecting or attempting to collect such debts. For the purpose of section 1692f(6) of this title, such term also includes any person who uses any instrumentality of interstate commerce or the mails in any business the principal purpose of which is the enforcement of security interests. The term does not include—
(A) any officer or employee of a creditor while, in the name of the creditor, collecting debts for such creditor;
(B) any person while acting as a debt collector for another person, both of whom are related by common ownership or affiliated by corporate control, if the person acting as a debt collector does so only for persons to whom it is so related or affiliated and if the principal business of such person is not the collection of debts;
(C) any officer or employee of the United States or any State to the extent that collecting or attempting to collect any debt is in the performance of his official duties;
(D) any person while serving or attempting to serve legal process on any other person in connection with the judicial enforcement of any debt;
(E) any nonprofit organization which, at the request of consumers, performs bona fide consumer credit counseling and assists consumers in the liquidation of their debts by receiving payments from such consumers and distributing such amounts to creditors; and
(F) any person collecting or attempting to collect any debt owed or due or asserted to be owed or due another to the extent such activity (i) is incidental to a bona fide fiduciary obligation or a bona fide escrow arrangement; (ii) concerns a debt which was originated by such person; (iii) concerns a debt which was not in default at the time it was obtained by such person; or (iv) concerns a debt obtained by such person as a secured party in a commercial credit transaction involving the creditor.
(7) The term “location information” means a consumer's place of abode and his telephone number at such place, or his place of employment.
(8) The term “State” means any State, territory, or possession of the United States, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, or any political subdivision of any of the foregoing.
(Pub. L. 90–321, title VIII, §803, as added Pub. L. 95–109, Sept. 20, 1977, 91 Stat. 875; amended Pub. L. 99–361, July 9, 1986, 100 Stat. 768; Pub. L. 111–203, title X, §1089(2), July 21, 2010, 124 Stat. 2092.)
2010—Par. (1). Pub. L. 111–203 added par. (1) and struck out former par. (1) which read as follows: “The term ‘Commission’ means the Federal Trade Commission.”
1986—Par. (6). Pub. L. 99–361 in provision preceding cl. (A) substituted “clause (F)” for “clause (G)”, struck out cl. (F) which excluded any attorney-at-law collecting a debt as an attorney on behalf of and in the name of a client from term “debt collector”, and redesignated cl. (G) as (F).
Effective Date of 2010 Amendment
Amendment by Pub. L. 111–203 effective on the designated transfer date, see section 1100H of Pub. L. 111–203, set out as a note under section 552a of Title 5, Government Organization and Employees.
§1692b. Acquisition of location information
Any debt collector communicating with any person other than the consumer for the purpose of acquiring location information about the consumer shall—
(1) identify himself, state that he is confirming or correcting location information concerning the consumer, and, only if expressly requested, identify his employer;
(2) not state that such consumer owes any debt;
(3) not communicate with any such person more than once unless requested to do so by such person or unless the debt collector reasonably believes that the earlier response of such person is erroneous or incomplete and that such person now has correct or complete location information;
(4) not communicate by post card;
(5) not use any language or symbol on any envelope or in the contents of any communication effected by the mails or telegram that indicates that the debt collector is in the debt collection business or that the communication relates to the collection of a debt; and
(6) after the debt collector knows the consumer is represented by an attorney with regard to the subject debt and has knowledge of, or can readily ascertain, such attorney's name and address, not communicate with any person other than that attorney, unless the attorney fails to respond within a reasonable period of time to communication from the debt collector.
(Pub. L. 90–321, title VIII, §804, as added Pub. L. 95–109, Sept. 20, 1977, 91 Stat. 876.)
§1692c. Communication in connection with debt collection
(a) Communication with the consumer generally
Without the prior consent of the consumer given directly to the debt collector or the express permission of a court of competent jurisdiction, a debt collector may not communicate with a consumer in connection with the collection of any debt—
(1) at any unusual time or place or a time or place known or which should be known to be inconvenient to the consumer. In the absence of knowledge of circumstances to the contrary, a debt collector shall assume that the convenient time for communicating with a consumer is after 8 o'clock antemeridian and before 9 o'clock postmeridian, local time at the consumer's location;
(2) if the debt collector knows the consumer is represented by an attorney with respect to such debt and has knowledge of, or can readily ascertain, such attorney's name and address, unless the attorney fails to respond within a reasonable period of time to a communication from the debt collector or unless the attorney consents to direct communication with the consumer; or
(3) at the consumer's place of employment if the debt collector knows or has reason to know that the consumer's employer prohibits the consumer from receiving such communication.
(b) Communication with third parties
Except as provided in section 1692b of this title, without the prior consent of the consumer given directly to the debt collector, or the express permission of a court of competent jurisdiction, or as reasonably necessary to effectuate a postjudgment judicial remedy, a debt collector may not communicate, in connection with the collection of any debt, with any person other than the consumer, his attorney, a consumer reporting agency if otherwise permitted by law, the creditor, the attorney of the creditor, or the attorney of the debt collector.
(c) Ceasing communication
If a consumer notifies a debt collector in writing that the consumer refuses to pay a debt or that the consumer wishes the debt collector to cease further communication with the consumer, the debt collector shall not communicate further with the consumer with respect to such debt, except—
(1) to advise the consumer that the debt collector's further efforts are being terminated;
(2) to notify the consumer that the debt collector or creditor may invoke specified remedies which are ordinarily invoked by such debt collector or creditor; or
(3) where applicable, to notify the consumer that the debt collector or creditor intends to invoke a specified remedy.
If such notice from the consumer is made by mail, notification shall be complete upon receipt.
(d) “Consumer” defined
For the purpose of this section, the term “consumer” includes the consumer's spouse, parent (if the consumer is a minor), guardian, executor, or administrator.
(Pub. L. 90–321, title VIII, §805, as added Pub. L. 95–109, Sept. 20, 1977, 91 Stat. 876.)
§1692d. Harassment or abuse
A debt collector may not engage in any conduct the natural consequence of which is to harass, oppress, or abuse any person in connection with the collection of a debt. Without limiting the general application of the foregoing, the following conduct is a violation of this section:
(1) The use or threat of use of violence or other criminal means to harm the physical person, reputation, or property of any person.
(2) The use of obscene or profane language or language the natural consequence of which is to abuse the hearer or reader.
(3) The publication of a list of consumers who allegedly refuse to pay debts, except to a consumer reporting agency or to persons meeting the requirements of section 1681a(f) or 1681b(3) 1 of this title.
(4) The advertisement for sale of any debt to coerce payment of the debt.
(5) Causing a telephone to ring or engaging any person in telephone conversation repeatedly or continuously with intent to annoy, abuse, or harass any person at the called number.
(6) Except as provided in section 1692b of this title, the placement of telephone calls without meaningful disclosure of the caller's identity.
(Pub. L. 90–321, title VIII, §806, as added Pub. L. 95–109, Sept. 20, 1977, 91 Stat. 877.)
References in Text
Section 1681b(3) of this title, referred to in par. (3), was redesignated section 1681b(a)(3) of this title by Pub. L. 104–208, div. A, title II, §2403(a)(1), Sept. 30, 1996, 110 Stat. 3009–430.
§1692e. False or misleading representations
A debt collector may not use any false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt. Without limiting the general application of the foregoing, the following conduct is a violation of this section:
(1) The false representation or implication that the debt collector is vouched for, bonded by, or affiliated with the United States or any State, including the use of any badge, uniform, or facsimile thereof.
(2) The false representation of—
(A) the character, amount, or legal status of any debt; or
(B) any services rendered or compensation which may be lawfully received by any debt collector for the collection of a debt.
(3) The false representation or implication that any individual is an attorney or that any communication is from an attorney.
(4) The representation or implication that nonpayment of any debt will result in the arrest or imprisonment of any person or the seizure, garnishment, attachment, or sale of any property or wages of any person unless such action is lawful and the debt collector or creditor intends to take such action.
(5) The threat to take any action that cannot legally be taken or that is not intended to be taken.
(6) The false representation or implication that a sale, referral, or other transfer of any interest in a debt shall cause the consumer to—
(A) lose any claim or defense to payment of the debt; or
(B) become subject to any practice prohibited by this subchapter.
(7) The false representation or implication that the consumer committed any crime or other conduct in order to disgrace the consumer.
(8) Communicating or threatening to communicate to any person credit information which is known or which should be known to be false, including the failure to communicate that a disputed debt is disputed.
(9) The use or distribution of any written communication which simulates or is falsely represented to be a document authorized, issued, or approved by any court, official, or agency of the United States or any State, or which creates a false impression as to its source, authorization, or approval.
(10) The use of any false representation or deceptive means to collect or attempt to collect any debt or to obtain information concerning a consumer.
(11) The failure to disclose in the initial written communication with the consumer and, in addition, if the initial communication with the consumer is oral, in that initial oral communication, that the debt collector is attempting to collect a debt and that any information obtained will be used for that purpose, and the failure to disclose in subsequent communications that the communication is from a debt collector, except that this paragraph shall not apply to a formal pleading made in connection with a legal action.
(12) The false representation or implication that accounts have been turned over to innocent purchasers for value.
(13) The false representation or implication that documents are legal process.
(14) The use of any business, company, or organization name other than the true name of the debt collector's business, company, or organization.
(15) The false representation or implication that documents are not legal process forms or do not require action by the consumer.
(16) The false representation or implication that a debt collector operates or is employed by a consumer reporting agency as defined by section 1681a(f) of this title.
(Pub. L. 90–321, title VIII, §807, as added Pub. L. 95–109, Sept. 20, 1977, 91 Stat. 877; amended Pub. L. 104–208, div. A, title II, §2305(a), Sept. 30, 1996, 110 Stat. 3009–425.)
1996—Par. (11). Pub. L. 104–208 amended par. (11) generally. Prior to amendment, par. (11) read as follows: “Except as otherwise provided for communications to acquire location information under section 1692b of this title, the failure to disclose clearly in all communications made to collect a debt or to obtain information about a consumer, that the debt collector is attempting to collect a debt and that any information obtained will be used for that purpose.”
Effective Date of 1996 Amendment
Pub. L. 104–208, div. A, title II, §2305(b), Sept. 30, 1996, 110 Stat. 3009–425, provided that: “The amendment made by subsection (a) [amending this section] shall take effect 90 days after the date of enactment of this Act [Sept. 30, 1996] and shall apply to all communications made after that date of enactment.”
§1692f. Unfair practices
A debt collector may not use unfair or unconscionable means to collect or attempt to collect any debt. Without limiting the general application of the foregoing, the following conduct is a violation of this section:
(1) The collection of any amount (including any interest, fee, charge, or expense incidental to the principal obligation) unless such amount is expressly authorized by the agreement creating the debt or permitted by law.
(2) The acceptance by a debt collector from any person of a check or other payment instrument postdated by more than five days unless such person is notified in writing of the debt collector's intent to deposit such check or instrument not more than ten nor less than three business days prior to such deposit.
(3) The solicitation by a debt collector of any postdated check or other postdated payment instrument for the purpose of threatening or instituting criminal prosecution.
(4) Depositing or threatening to deposit any postdated check or other postdated payment instrument prior to the date on such check or instrument.
(5) Causing charges to be made to any person for communications by concealment of the true purpose of the communication. Such charges include, but are not limited to, collect telephone calls and telegram fees.
(6) Taking or threatening to take any nonjudicial action to effect dispossession or disablement of property if—
(A) there is no present right to possession of the property claimed as collateral through an enforceable security interest;
(B) there is no present intention to take possession of the property; or
(C) the property is exempt by law from such dispossession or disablement.
(7) Communicating with a consumer regarding a debt by post card.
(8) Using any language or symbol, other than the debt collector's address, on any envelope when communicating with a consumer by use of the mails or by telegram, except that a debt collector may use his business name if such name does not indicate that he is in the debt collection business.
(Pub. L. 90–321, title VIII, §808, as added Pub. L. 95–109, Sept. 20, 1977, 91 Stat. 879.)
§1692g. Validation of debts
(a) Notice of debt; contents
Within five days after the initial communication with a consumer in connection with the collection of any debt, a debt collector shall, unless the following information is contained in the initial communication or the consumer has paid the debt, send the consumer a written notice containing—
(1) the amount of the debt;
(2) the name of the creditor to whom the debt is owed;
(3) a statement that unless the consumer, within thirty days after receipt of the notice, disputes the validity of the debt, or any portion thereof, the debt will be assumed to be valid by the debt collector;
(4) a statement that if the consumer notifies the debt collector in writing within the thirty-day period that the debt, or any portion thereof, is disputed, the debt collector will obtain verification of the debt or a copy of a judgment against the consumer and a copy of such verification or judgment will be mailed to the consumer by the debt collector; and
(5) a statement that, upon the consumer's written request within the thirty-day period, the debt collector will provide the consumer with the name and address of the original creditor, if different from the current creditor.
(b) Disputed debts
If the consumer notifies the debt collector in writing within the thirty-day period described in subsection (a) of this section that the debt, or any portion thereof, is disputed, or that the consumer requests the name and address of the original creditor, the debt collector shall cease collection of the debt, or any disputed portion thereof, until the debt collector obtains verification of the debt or a copy of a judgment, or the name and address of the original creditor, and a copy of such verification or judgment, or name and address of the original creditor, is mailed to the consumer by the debt collector. Collection activities and communications that do not otherwise violate this subchapter may continue during the 30-day period referred to in subsection (a) unless the consumer has notified the debt collector in writing that the debt, or any portion of the debt, is disputed or that the consumer requests the name and address of the original creditor. Any collection activities and communication during the 30-day period may not overshadow or be inconsistent with the disclosure of the consumer's right to dispute the debt or request the name and address of the original creditor.
(c) Admission of liability
The failure of a consumer to dispute the validity of a debt under this section may not be construed by any court as an admission of liability by the consumer.
(d) Legal pleadings
A communication in the form of a formal pleading in a civil action shall not be treated as an initial communication for purposes of subsection (a).
(e) Notice provisions
The sending or delivery of any form or notice which does not relate to the collection of a debt and is expressly required by title 26, title V of Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act [15 U.S.C. 6801 et seq.], or any provision of Federal or State law relating to notice of data security breach or privacy, or any regulation prescribed under any such provision of law, shall not be treated as an initial communication in connection with debt collection for purposes of this section.
(Pub. L. 90–321, title VIII, §809, as added Pub. L. 95–109, Sept. 20, 1977, 91 Stat. 879; amended Pub. L. 109–351, title VIII, §802, Oct. 13, 2006, 120 Stat. 2006.)
References in Text
The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, referred to in subsec. (e), is Pub. L. 106–102, Nov. 12, 1999, 113 Stat. 1338. Title V of the Act is classified principally to chapter 94 (§ 6801 et seq.) of this title. For complete classification of this Act to the Code, see Short Title of 1999 Amendment note set out under section 1811 of Title 12, Banks and Banking, and Tables.
2006—Subsec. (b). Pub. L. 109–351, §802(c), inserted at end “Collection activities and communications that do not otherwise violate this subchapter may continue during the 30-day period referred to in subsection (a) unless the consumer has notified the debt collector in writing that the debt, or any portion of the debt, is disputed or that the consumer requests the name and address of the original creditor. Any collection activities and communication during the 30-day period may not overshadow or be inconsistent with the disclosure of the consumer's right to dispute the debt or request the name and address of the original creditor.”
Subsec. (d). Pub. L. 109–351, §802(a), added subsec. (d).
Subsec. (e). Pub. L. 109–351, §802(b), added subsec. (e).
Section applicable only with respect to debts for which the initial attempt to collect occurs after the effective date of this subchapter, which takes effect upon the expiration of six months after Sept. 20, 1977, see section 819 of Pub. L. 90–321, set out as a note under section 1692 of this title.
§1692h. Multiple debts
If any consumer owes multiple debts and makes any single payment to any debt collector with respect to such debts, such debt collector may not apply such payment to any debt which is disputed by the consumer and, where applicable, shall apply such payment in accordance with the consumer's directions.
(Pub. L. 90–321, title VIII, §810, as added Pub. L. 95–109, Sept. 20, 1977, 91 Stat. 880.)
§1692i. Legal actions by debt collectors
Any debt collector who brings any legal action on a debt against any consumer shall—
(1) in the case of an action to enforce an interest in real property securing the consumer's obligation, bring such action only in a judicial district or similar legal entity in which such real property is located; or
(2) in the case of an action not described in paragraph (1), bring such action only in the judicial district or similar legal entity—
(A) in which such consumer signed the contract sued upon; or
(B) in which such consumer resides at the commencement of the action.
(b) Authorization of actions
Nothing in this subchapter shall be construed to authorize the bringing of legal actions by debt collectors.
(Pub. L. 90–321, title VIII, §811, as added Pub. L. 95–109, Sept. 20, 1977, 91 Stat. 880.)
§1692j. Furnishing certain deceptive forms
(a) It is unlawful to design, compile, and furnish any form knowing that such form would be used to create the false belief in a consumer that a person other than the creditor of such consumer is participating in the collection of or in an attempt to collect a debt such consumer allegedly owes such creditor, when in fact such person is not so participating.
(b) Any person who violates this section shall be liable to the same extent and in the same manner as a debt collector is liable under section 1692k of this title for failure to comply with a provision of this subchapter.
(Pub. L. 90–321, title VIII, §812, as added Pub. L. 95–109, Sept. 20, 1977, 91 Stat. 880.)
§1692k. Civil liability
(a) Amount of damages
Except as otherwise provided by this section, any debt collector who fails to comply with any provision of this subchapter with respect to any person is liable to such person in an amount equal to the sum of—
(1) any actual damage sustained by such person as a result of such failure;
(2)(A) in the case of any action by an individual, such additional damages as the court may allow, but not exceeding $1,000; or
(B) in the case of a class action, (i) such amount for each named plaintiff as could be recovered under subparagraph (A), and (ii) such amount as the court may allow for all other class members, without regard to a minimum individual recovery, not to exceed the lesser of $500,000 or 1 per centum of the net worth of the debt collector; and
(3) in the case of any successful action to enforce the foregoing liability, the costs of the action, together with a reasonable attorney's fee as determined by the court. On a finding by the court that an action under this section was brought in bad faith and for the purpose of harassment, the court may award to the defendant attorney's fees reasonable in relation to the work expended and costs.
(b) Factors considered by court
In determining the amount of liability in any action under subsection (a) of this section, the court shall consider, among other relevant factors—
(1) in any individual action under subsection (a)(2)(A) of this section, the frequency and persistence of noncompliance by the debt collector, the nature of such noncompliance, and the extent to which such noncompliance was intentional; or
(2) in any class action under subsection (a)(2)(B) of this section, the frequency and persistence of noncompliance by the debt collector, the nature of such noncompliance, the resources of the debt collector, the number of persons adversely affected, and the extent to which the debt collector's noncompliance was intentional.
A debt collector may not be held liable in any action brought under this subchapter if the debt collector shows by a preponderance of evidence that the violation was not intentional and resulted from a bona fide error notwithstanding the maintenance of procedures reasonably adapted to avoid any such error.
An action to enforce any liability created by this subchapter may be brought in any appropriate United States district court without regard to the amount in controversy, or in any other court of competent jurisdiction, within one year from the date on which the violation occurs.
(e) Advisory opinions of Bureau
No provision of this section imposing any liability shall apply to any act done or omitted in good faith in conformity with any advisory opinion of the Bureau, notwithstanding that after such act or omission has occurred, such opinion is amended, rescinded, or determined by judicial or other authority to be invalid for any reason.
(Pub. L. 90–321, title VIII, §813, as added Pub. L. 95–109, Sept. 20, 1977, 91 Stat. 881; amended Pub. L. 111–203, title X, §1089(1), July 21, 2010, 124 Stat. 2092.)
2010—Subsec. (e). Pub. L. 111–203 substituted “Bureau” for “Commission”.
Effective Date of 2010 Amendment
Amendment by Pub. L. 111–203 effective on the designated transfer date, see section 1100H of Pub. L. 111–203, set out as a note under section 552a of Title 5, Government Organization and Employees.
§1692l. Administrative enforcement
(a) Federal Trade Commission
The Federal Trade Commission shall be authorized to enforce compliance with this subchapter, except to the extent that enforcement of the requirements imposed under this subchapter is specifically committed to another Government agency under any of paragraphs (1) through (5) of subsection (b), subject to subtitle B of the Consumer Financial Protection Act of 2010 [12 U.S.C. 5511 et seq.]. For purpose of the exercise by the Federal Trade Commission of its functions and powers under the Federal Trade Commission Act (15 U.S.C. 41 et seq.), a violation of this subchapter shall be deemed an unfair or deceptive act or practice in violation of that Act. All of the functions and powers of the Federal Trade Commission under the Federal Trade Commission Act are available to the Federal Trade Commission to enforce compliance by any person with this subchapter, irrespective of whether that person is engaged in commerce or meets any other jurisdictional tests under the Federal Trade Commission Act, including the power to enforce the provisions of this subchapter, in the same manner as if the violation had been a violation of a Federal Trade Commission trade regulation rule.
(b) Applicable provisions of law
Subject to subtitle B of the Consumer Financial Protection Act of 2010, compliance with any requirements imposed under this subchapter shall be enforced under—
(1) section 8 of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act [12 U.S.C. 1818], by the appropriate Federal banking agency, as defined in section 3(q) of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act (12 U.S.C. 1813(q)), with respect to—
(A) national banks, Federal savings associations, and Federal branches and Federal agencies of foreign banks;
(B) member banks of the Federal Reserve System (other than national banks), branches and agencies of foreign banks (other than Federal branches, Federal agencies, and insured State branches of foreign banks), commercial lending companies owned or controlled by foreign banks, and organizations operating under section 25 or 25A of the Federal Reserve Act [12 U.S.C. 601 et seq., 611 et seq.]; and
(C) banks and State savings associations insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (other than members of the Federal Reserve System), and insured State branches of foreign banks;
(2) the Federal Credit Union Act [12 U.S.C. 1751 et seq.], by the Administrator of the National Credit Union Administration with respect to any Federal credit union;
(3) subtitle IV of title 49, by the Secretary of Transportation, with respect to all carriers subject to the jurisdiction of the Surface Transportation Board;
(4) part A of subtitle VII of title 49, by the Secretary of Transportation with respect to any air carrier or any foreign air carrier subject to that part;
(5) the Packers and Stockyards Act, 1921 [7 U.S.C. 181 et seq.] (except as provided in section 406 of that Act [7 U.S.C. 226, 227]), by the Secretary of Agriculture with respect to any activities subject to that Act; and
(6) subtitle E of the Consumer Financial Protection Act of 2010 [12 U.S.C. 5561 et seq.], by the Bureau, with respect to any person subject to this subchapter.
The terms used in paragraph (1) that are not defined in this subchapter or otherwise defined in section 3(s) of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act (12 U.S.C. 1813(s)) shall have the meaning given to them in section 1(b) of the International Banking Act of 1978 (12 U.S.C. 3101).
(c) Agency powers
For the purpose of the exercise by any agency referred to in subsection (b) of this section of its powers under any Act referred to in that subsection, a violation of any requirement imposed under this subchapter shall be deemed to be a violation of a requirement imposed under that Act. In addition to its powers under any provision of law specifically referred to in subsection (b) of this section, each of the agencies referred to in that subsection may exercise, for the purpose of enforcing compliance with any requirement imposed under this subchapter any other authority conferred on it by law, except as provided in subsection (d) of this section.
(d) Rules and regulations
Except as provided in section 1029(a) of the Consumer Financial Protection Act of 2010 [12 U.S.C. 5519(a)], the Bureau may prescribe rules with respect to the collection of debts by debt collectors, as defined in this subchapter.
(Pub. L. 90–321, title VIII, §814, as added Pub. L. 95–109, Sept. 20, 1977, 91 Stat. 881; amended Pub. L. 98–443, §9(n), Oct. 4, 1984, 98 Stat. 1708; Pub. L. 101–73, title VII, §744(n), Aug. 9, 1989, 103 Stat. 440; Pub. L. 102–242, title II, §212(e), Dec. 19, 1991, 105 Stat. 2301; Pub. L. 102–550, title XVI, §1604(a)(8), Oct. 28, 1992, 106 Stat. 4082; Pub. L. 104–88, title III, §316, Dec. 29, 1995, 109 Stat. 949; Pub. L. 111–203, title X, §1089(3), (4), July 21, 2010, 124 Stat. 2092, 2093.)
References in Text
The Consumer Financial Protection Act of 2010, referred to in subsecs. (a) and (b), is title X of Pub. L. 111–203, July 21, 2010, 124 Stat. 1955. Subtitles B (§§1021–1029A) and E (§§1051–1058) of the Act are classified generally to parts B (§5511 et seq.) and E (§5561 et seq.), respectively, of subchapter V of chapter 53 of Title 12, Banks and Banking. For complete classification of subtitles B and E to the Code, see Tables.
The Federal Trade Commission Act, referred to in subsec. (a), is act Sept. 26, 1914, ch. 311, 38 Stat. 717, which is classified generally to subchapter I (§41 et seq.) of chapter 2 of this title. For complete classification of this Act to the Code, see section 58 of this title and Tables.
Sections 25 and 25A of the Federal Reserve Act, referred to in subsec. (b)(1)(B), are classified to subchapters I (§601 et seq.) and II (§611 et seq.), respectively, of chapter 6 of Title 12, Banks and Banking.
The Federal Credit Union Act, referred to in subsec. (b)(2), is act June 26, 1934, ch. 750, 48 Stat. 1216, which is classified generally to chapter 14 (§1751 et seq.) of Title 12. For complete classification of this Act to the Code, see section 1751 of Title 12 and Tables.
The Packers and Stockyards Act, 1921, referred to in subsec. (b)(5), is act Aug. 15, 1921, ch. 64, 42 Stat. 159, which is classified generally to chapter 9 (§181 et seq.) of Title 7, Agriculture. For complete classification of this Act to the Code, see section 181 of Title 7 and Tables.
In subsec. (b)(3), “subtitle IV of title 49” substituted for “the Acts to regulate commerce” on authority of Pub. L. 95–473, §3(b), Oct. 17, 1978, 92 Stat. 1466, the first section of which enacted subtitle IV of Title 49, Transportation.
In subsec. (b)(4), “part A of subtitle VII of title 49” substituted for “the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 [49 App. U.S.C. 1301 et seq.]” and “that part” substituted for “that Act” on authority of Pub. L. 103–272, §6(b), July 5, 1994, 108 Stat. 1378, the first section of which enacted subtitles II, III, and V to X of Title 49.
Section 1089(4) of Pub. L. 111–203, which directed amendment “in subsection (d)” of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, was executed in subsec. (d) of this section, which is section 814 of the Act, to reflect the probable intent of Congress. See 2010 Amendment note below.
2010—Subsec. (a). Pub. L. 111–203, §1089(3)(A), added subsec. (a) and struck out former subsec. (a). Prior to amendment, text read as follows: “Compliance with this subchapter shall be enforced by the Commission, except to the extent that enforcement of the requirements imposed under this subchapter is specifically committed to another agency under subsection (b) of this section. For purpose of the exercise by the Commission of its functions and powers under the Federal Trade Commission Act, a violation of this subchapter shall be deemed an unfair or deceptive act or practice in violation of that Act. All of the functions and powers of the Commission under the Federal Trade Commission Act are available to the Commission to enforce compliance by any person with this subchapter, irrespective of whether that person is engaged in commerce or meets any other jurisdictional tests in the Federal Trade Commission Act, including the power to enforce the provisions of this subchapter in the same manner as if the violation had been a violation of a Federal Trade Commission trade regulation rule.”
Subsec. (b). Pub. L. 111–203, §1089(3)(B)(i), substituted “Subject to subtitle B of the Consumer Financial Protection Act of 2010, compliance” for “Compliance” in introductory provisions.
Subsec. (b)(1). Pub. L. 111–203, §1089(3)(B)(ii), added par. (1) and struck out former par. (1) which read as follows: “section 8 of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act, in the case of—
“(A) national banks, and Federal branches and Federal agencies of foreign banks, by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency;
“(B) member banks of the Federal Reserve System (other than national banks), branches and agencies of foreign banks (other than Federal branches, Federal agencies, and insured State branches of foreign banks), commercial lending companies owned or controlled by foreign banks, and organizations operating under section 25 or 25(a) of the Federal Reserve Act, by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System; and
“(C) banks insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (other than members of the Federal Reserve System) and insured State branches of foreign banks, by the Board of Directors of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation;”.
Subsec. (b)(2) to (6). Pub. L. 111–203, §1089(3)(B)(ii)–(vi), added par. (6), redesignated former pars. (3) to (6) as (2) to (5), respectively, and struck out former par. (2) which read as follows: “section 8 of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act, by the Director of the Office of Thrift Supervision, in the case of a savings association the deposits of which are insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation;”.
Subsec. (d). Pub. L. 111–203, §1089(4), substituted “Except as provided in section 1029(a) of the Consumer Financial Protection Act of 2010, the Bureau may prescribe rules with respect to the collection of debts by debt collectors, as defined in this subchapter” for “Neither the Commission nor any other agency referred to in subsection (b) of this section may promulgate trade regulation rules or other regulations with respect to the collection of debts by debt collectors as defined in this subchapter”. See Codification note above.
1995—Subsec. (b)(4). Pub. L. 104–88 substituted “Secretary of Transportation, with respect to all carriers subject to the jurisdiction of the Surface Transportation Board” for “Interstate Commerce Commission with respect to any common carrier subject to those Acts”.
1992—Subsec. (b)(1)(C). Pub. L. 102–550 substituted semicolon for period at end.
1991—Subsec. (b). Pub. L. 102–242, §212(e)(2), inserted at end “The terms used in paragraph (1) that are not defined in this subchapter or otherwise defined in section 3(s) of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act (12 U.S.C. 1813(s)) shall have the meaning given to them in section 1(b) of the International Banking Act of 1978 (12 U.S.C. 3101).”
Pub. L. 102–242, §212(e)(1), added par. (1) and struck out former par. (1) which read as follows: “section 8 of Federal Deposit Insurance Act, in the case of—
“(A) national banks, by the Comptroller of the Currency;
“(B) member banks of the Federal Reserve System (other than national banks), by the Federal Reserve Board; and
“(C) banks the deposits or accounts of which are insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (other than members of the Federal Reserve System), by the Board of Directors of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation;”.
1989—Subsec. (b)(2). Pub. L. 101–73 amended par. (2) generally. Prior to amendment, par. (2) read as follows: “section 5(d) of the Home Owners Loan Act of 1933, section 407 of the National Housing Act, and sections 6(i) and 17 of the Federal Home Loan Bank Act, by the Federal Home Loan Bank Board (acting directly or through the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation), in the case of any institution subject to any of those provisions;”.
1984—Subsec. (b)(5). Pub. L. 98–443 substituted “Secretary of Transportation” for “Civil Aeronautics Board”.
Effective Date of 2010 Amendment
Amendment by Pub. L. 111–203 effective on the designated transfer date, see section 1100H of Pub. L. 111–203, set out as a note under section 552a of Title 5, Government Organization and Employees.
Effective Date of 1995 Amendment
Amendment by Pub. L. 104–88 effective Jan. 1, 1996, see section 2 of Pub. L. 104–88, set out as an Effective Date note under section 701 of Title 49, Transportation.
Effective Date of 1992 Amendment
Amendment by Pub. L. 102–550 effective as if included in the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991, Pub. L. 102–242, as of Dec. 19, 1991, see section 1609(a) of Pub. L. 102–550, set out as a note under section 191 of Title 12, Banks and Banking.
Effective Date of 1984 Amendment
Amendment by Pub. L. 98–443 effective Jan. 1, 1985, see section 9(v) of Pub. L. 98–443, set out as a note under section 5314 of Title 5, Government Organization and Employees.
Transfer of Functions
Functions vested in Administrator of National Credit Union Administration transferred and vested in National Credit Union Administration Board pursuant to section 1752a of Title 12, Banks and Banking.
§1692m. Reports to Congress by the Bureau; views of other Federal agencies
(a) Not later than one year after the effective date of this subchapter and at one-year intervals thereafter, the Bureau shall make reports to the Congress concerning the administration of its functions under this subchapter, including such recommendations as the Bureau deems necessary or appropriate. In addition, each report of the Bureau shall include its assessment of the extent to which compliance with this subchapter is being achieved and a summary of the enforcement actions taken by the Bureau under section 1692l of this title.
(b) In the exercise of its functions under this subchapter, the Bureau may obtain upon request the views of any other Federal agency which exercises enforcement functions under section 1692l of this title.
(Pub. L. 90–321, title VIII, §815, as added Pub. L. 95–109, Sept. 20, 1977, 91 Stat. 882; amended Pub. L. 111–203, title X, §1089(1), July 21, 2010, 124 Stat. 2092.)
References in Text
The effective date of this subchapter, referred to in subsec. (a), is the date occurring on expiration of six months after Sept. 20, 1977. See section 819 of Pub. L. 90–321, set out as an Effective Date note under section 1692 of this title.
2010—Pub. L. 111–203 substituted “Bureau” for “Commission” wherever appearing.
Effective Date of 2010 Amendment
§1692n. Relation to State laws
This subchapter does not annul, alter, or affect, or exempt any person subject to the provisions of this subchapter from complying with the laws of any State with respect to debt collection practices, except to the extent that those laws are inconsistent with any provision of this subchapter, and then only to the extent of the inconsistency. For purposes of this section, a State law is not inconsistent with this subchapter if the protection such law affords any consumer is greater than the protection provided by this subchapter.
(Pub. L. 90–321, title VIII, §816, as added Pub. L. 95–109, Sept. 20, 1977, 91 Stat. 883.)
§1692o. Exemption for State regulation
The Bureau shall by regulation exempt from the requirements of this subchapter any class of debt collection practices within any State if the Bureau determines that under the law of that State that class of debt collection practices is subject to requirements substantially similar to those imposed by this subchapter, and that there is adequate provision for enforcement.
(Pub. L. 90–321, title VIII, §817, as added Pub. L. 95–109, Sept. 20, 1977, 91 Stat. 883; amended Pub. L. 111–203, title X, §1089(1), July 21, 2010, 124 Stat. 2092.)
2010—Pub. L. 111–203 substituted “Bureau” for “Commission” in two places.
Effective Date of 2010 Amendment
§1692p. Exception for certain bad check enforcement programs operated by private entities
(a) In general
(1) Treatment of certain private entities
Subject to paragraph (2), a private entity shall be excluded from the definition of a debt collector, pursuant to the exception provided in section 1692a(6) of this title, with respect to the operation by the entity of a program described in paragraph (2)(A) under a contract described in paragraph (2)(B).
(2) Conditions of applicability
Paragraph (1) shall apply if—
(A) a State or district attorney establishes, within the jurisdiction of such State or district attorney and with respect to alleged bad check violations that do not involve a check described in subsection (b), a pretrial diversion program for alleged bad check offenders who agree to participate voluntarily in such program to avoid criminal prosecution;
(B) a private entity, that is subject to an administrative support services contract with a State or district attorney and operates under the direction, supervision, and control of such State or district attorney, operates the pretrial diversion program described in subparagraph (A); and
(C) in the course of performing duties delegated to it by a State or district attorney under the contract, the private entity referred to in subparagraph (B)—
(i) complies with the penal laws of the State;
(ii) conforms with the terms of the contract and directives of the State or district attorney;
(iii) does not exercise independent prosecutorial discretion;
(iv) contacts any alleged offender referred to in subparagraph (A) for purposes of participating in a program referred to in such paragraph—
(I) only as a result of any determination by the State or district attorney that probable cause of a bad check violation under State penal law exists, and that contact with the alleged offender for purposes of participation in the program is appropriate; and
(II) the alleged offender has failed to pay the bad check after demand for payment, pursuant to State law, is made for payment of the check amount;
(v) includes as part of an initial written communication with an alleged offender a clear and conspicuous statement that—
(I) the alleged offender may dispute the validity of any alleged bad check violation;
(II) where the alleged offender knows, or has reasonable cause to believe, that the alleged bad check violation is the result of theft or forgery of the check, identity theft, or other fraud that is not the result of the conduct of the alleged offender, the alleged offender may file a crime report with the appropriate law enforcement agency; and
(III) if the alleged offender notifies the private entity or the district attorney in writing, not later than 30 days after being contacted for the first time pursuant to clause (iv), that there is a dispute pursuant to this subsection, before further restitution efforts are pursued, the district attorney or an employee of the district attorney authorized to make such a determination makes a determination that there is probable cause to believe that a crime has been committed; and
(vi) charges only fees in connection with services under the contract that have been authorized by the contract with the State or district attorney.
(b) Certain checks excluded
A check is described in this subsection if the check involves, or is subsequently found to involve—
(1) a postdated check presented in connection with a payday loan, or other similar transaction, where the payee of the check knew that the issuer had insufficient funds at the time the check was made, drawn, or delivered;
(2) a stop payment order where the issuer acted in good faith and with reasonable cause in stopping payment on the check;
(3) a check dishonored because of an adjustment to the issuer's account by the financial institution holding such account without providing notice to the person at the time the check was made, drawn, or delivered;
(4) a check for partial payment of a debt where the payee had previously accepted partial payment for such debt;
(5) a check issued by a person who was not competent, or was not of legal age, to enter into a legal contractual obligation at the time the check was made, drawn, or delivered; or
(6) a check issued to pay an obligation arising from a transaction that was illegal in the jurisdiction of the State or district attorney at the time the check was made, drawn, or delivered.
For purposes of this section, the following definitions shall apply:
(1) State or district attorney
The term “State or district attorney” means the chief elected or appointed prosecuting attorney in a district, county (as defined in section 2 of title 1), municipality, or comparable jurisdiction, including State attorneys general who act as chief elected or appointed prosecuting attorneys in a district, county (as so defined), municipality or comparable jurisdiction, who may be referred to by a variety of titles such as district attorneys, prosecuting attorneys, commonwealth's attorneys, solicitors, county attorneys, and state's attorneys, and who are responsible for the prosecution of State crimes and violations of jurisdiction-specific local ordinances.
The term “check” has the same meaning as in section 5002(6) of title 12.
(3) Bad check violation
The term “bad check violation” means a violation of the applicable State criminal law relating to the writing of dishonored checks.
(Pub. L. 90–321, title VIII, §818, as added Pub. L. 109–351, title VIII, §801(a)(2), Oct. 13, 2006, 120 Stat. 2004.)
|Case||Venue||Decided||Issues||Disposition for ARM Firm|
|Abby Bereket, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. Portfolio Recovery Associates, LLC, et al., Defendants.||2017 WL 4409480 (W.D. WA) Case No. C17-0812-RSM||October 2017||Failure to advise (in a collection letter) that payment on a time-barred debt could revive statute of limitations did state a claim under the FDCPA.||Negative|
|Darian Derosa v. CAC Financial||2017 WL 4402459 Case No. 16–CV–1472||October 2017||Debt collector is not under an affirmative duty to advise that a debt will not incur interest or fees. Statement made in the collection letter, which made no reference to interest and fees.||Positive|
|Eric Delfonce, AKA Elie Delfonce, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Eltman Law, P.C., Defendant-Appellee.||___ Fed.Appx. ___2017 WL 4410642 (2nd Cir) Case No. 17-792-cv||October 2017||Law firm sent a regarding a prior judgment. Letter had a disclaimer of attorney involvement and a statement that the letter should not be construe as a threat of suit. Letter also contained information regarding the date of the judgment. Consumer said the letter was a threat of legal action because of the use of the word judgment. Lower court disagreed. Circuit affirmed and found that letter was not in anyway deceptive and disclaimer refuted any claim that use of the word "judgment" was a threat.||Positive|
|Olena Lysyuk, Plaintiff, v. I.C. System, Inc., Defendant.||2017 WL 4475962 (E.D. Ca) Case No.2:17-cv-00283-JAM-CKD||October 2017||Plaintiff agreed to dismiss her FDCPA claim. Defendants sought attorneys fees and costs from Plaintiff's counsel under 1692k(a)(3) . Court found that FDCPA provides only that attorney's fees come from the Plaintiff and not its counsel. Costs should be awarded. Court refused to award sanctions under §1927. Negative disposition as to the failure to award sanction.||Negative|
|Debra Klein, Plaintiff, v. Stellar Recovery, Inc., Defendant.||2017 WL 4551526 (E.D. MO) Case No. 4:16 CV 1480 (JMB)||October 2017||Consumer advised debt collector that she was represented by counsel. Debt collector asked for her mailing address to update their records. Consumer claims this was an FDPCA violation under 1692c(a). Court disagreed and said asking for updated information was not an attempt to collect a debt. The request for information was not made while asking for any money and communication was initiated by the consumer.||Positive|
|Daniel Bock, JR., Plaintiff, v. Pressler & Pressler, LLP, Defendant.||2017 WL 4711472 (D.N.J.) Case No. 11-7593-KM-SCM||October 2017||On remand, Court found that consumer had standing and summary judgment was entered in consumer's favor. While this decision was pending, law firm submitted supplemental expert report arguing court had “reversed the burden of proof” in its original summary judgment ruling, and that the FDCPA, at least as applied by the Court, violated Noerr-Pennington doctrine. Court denied motion finding that issue of an expert report should have been submitted 3 years ago and was not new evidence. Court also found that law firm failed to show that an FDCPA cause of action regarding a misrepresentation of meaningful attorney involvement requires expert testimony. Motion for reconsideration was denied.||Negative|
|Myron Hargreaves, Cortney Halvorsen, and Bonnie Freeman, Plaintiffs, v. Associated Credit Service, Inc., a Washington Corporation, and PAUL J. Wasson and Monica Wasson, individually and the marital community, Defendants.||2017 WL 4767146 (E.D. Wa) , Case No. 2:16-CV-0103-TOR||October 2017||Consumer brought FDCPA action against debt collector as the result of a garnishment. State law requires judgment creditor to affirm that judgment is unsatisfied, the amount due and that creditor has "reason to believe that the garnishee is indebted to debtor in amounts that exceed the exemption limited set by federal and state law" or are otherwise exempt. Consumer alleged that debt collector monies were exempt. Court found that debt collector's sworn affidavit was sufficient and furthermore GLB protects private information which includes bank account balances, so debt collector would have no way of knowing whether funds were subject to exemption.||Positive|
|Diane Rhone, Plaintiff, v. Medical Business Bureau, LLC, Defendant.||2017 WL 4875297 (N.D. Il) Case No. 16 C 5215||October 2017||Consumer incurred a balance on nine (9) physical therapy treatments. Debt collector reported each balance separately to the credit bureau. Court found that it was apparent that there was one debt that should have been reported in one tradeline and not separately. Debt collector would not have sent 9 separate letters nor file 9 separate lawsuits. Debt collector violated 1692e of the FDCPA. While the facts in this case were simple to warrant finding of a FDPCA violation, other medical procedures may not be as simple to parse out. This case is a bit disturbing and could have implications for medical collections and reporting.||Negative|
|Mohammad Ali Hedayati, Plaintiff, v. The Perry Law Firm, Defendant.||2017 WL 4864491 (C.D. Ca) Case No. SA CV 16-0846-DOC||October 2017||Bench trial on whether debt collectors efforts to collect debt violated FDCPA. Consumer was Mohammad Ali Hedayati, brother was Mohammad Hedayati. Debt collector served a foreclosure complaint on the brother for a property that brother did not own. Court concluded that even the least sophisticated debtor knows his own address and can understand that, and if he receives debt collection notices that list an address he doesn't recognize and a name similar to his own, that the debt collector likely has the wrong individual. Court found that debt collector did not violate the FDCPA just because Defendant targeted the wrong person when it mailed and served documents that themselves did not contain false statements.||Positive|
|John Dix, Plaintiff, v. National Credit Systems, Inc., Defendant.||2017 WL 4865259 (D. Az) Case No.2:16-cv-3257-HRH||October 2017||Debt collector send collection letter that identified creditor as "Re: Metro on 19th/Chamberlin & Assoc/G171". Creditor was Metro & 19th but the only place it was referenced was the subject line and court found that debt collector did nothing to identify Metro & 19th as the current creditor. This case seems to expand the requirements of 1692g(a)(2).||Negative|
|Randy Richardson, Plaintiff, v. LVNV Funding, LLC, and First National Collection Bureau, Inc., Defendants.||2017 WL 4921971 (N.D. Il) Case No. 16 C 9600||October 2017||Despite putting a disclosure that debt was old, Court found that consumer stated a claim that disclosure was still misleading because it gives false impression that debt collector has chosen not to sue him, instead of stating that debt collector cannot sue him because of the age of his debt.||Negative|
|Smith v. Cohn, Goldberg & Deutsch, LLC||2017 WL 4921695 (D. Md) Case No. RDB–17–2291||October 2017||Letter to consumer identified 4 separate entities and failed to identify creditor to whom debt was owed. Consumer's complaint stated a claim under 1692g(a)(2) and Defendant's motion to dismiss denied. Another case involving 1692g(b)(2).||Negative|
|Fatema Islam, Individually and on behalf of a class, Plaintiff, v. American Recovery Service Incorporated, Defendant.||2017 WL 4990570 (E.D. N.Y.) Case No. 17-cv-4228||October 2017||Court was constrained to follow Aviladecision from the 2nd Circuit. Court found that a collection letter that stated balance "as of this date", but also disclosed that no additional interest or fees were being charged, was ambiguous and thus false and deceptive. Important case and it sets up an impossible standard to meet to properly disclose that no further interest and fees will be charged to the consumer.||Negative|
|Sharpe v. Midland Credit Management||2017 WL 3863865 (E.D. Pa)||September 2017||Consumer alleged that validation notice was buried on the back page of a collection letter and obscured and overshadowed plaintiff's right to dispute. Court found that Plaintiff stated a claim. While it is not improper to put validation notice on the back of a collection letter with notices to consumer that the disclosures exist, court found that disclosures were far from conspicuous.||Negative|
|Beale v. Bruce||2017 WL 3927669 (N.D. Ok) Case No. 16–CV–618–JHP–FHM||September 2017||Demand letter stated that if consumer had a "valid reason for [their] failure to pay" they should contact the attorneys office. Consumer sued saying that lease sophisticated consumer would be lead to believe that that could only dispute if they had a valid reason to do so, thus statement overshadowed 1692g. Court disagreed stating that if you look at the entire disclosure law firm complied with the act and the statement does not overshadow or contradict the statutory right to dispute the debt within thirty days, with or without a “valid reason” for the dispute.||Positive|
|Hardin v. Finkelstein, Kern, Steinberg & Cunningham, P.C.||Fed.Appx. 2017 WL 4075073 (6th Cir.) Case No. 16-6542 (6th Cir)||September 2017||Consumer alleged that certain pleadings did not disclose that Defendant was a debt collector. The pleadings in questions were issued by the Court and not by the law firm and thus the adjudicative process cannot be construed as communications from the debt collector to the consumer.||Positive|
|Cooper v. Portfolio Recovery Associates, LLC||2017 WL 4098824 (E.D. Mi) Case No. 16-12969||September 2017||Consumer brought an action against debt buyer claiming that it did not sufficiently verify the debt. Debt buyer verified the debt pursuant to three requests from the consumer. Court following Haddad case, debt collector must provide information regarding “how and when the debt was originally incurred or other sufficient notice from which the consumer could sufficiently dispute the payment obligation.” Further, a debt collector is not required to independently verify the existence of a debt, but may rely on representations of the original creditor as to its existence and are entitled to rely on their client's statements to verify the debt. Debt buyer full filled obligations under the FDCPA||Positive|
|Koller v. Midland Credit Management, Inc.||2017 WL 4102744 (W.D. Mo) Case No. 4:17–cv–00430–DGK||September 2017||Collection letter had a "reply-by" date to contact debt buyer to discuss settlement options. Disclosures were on the reverse side of the letter. Consumer alleged that "reply-by" contradicted and overshadowed disclosures in violation of 1692g. Court disagreed since reply-by date was outside 30 day period and it was not otherwise false and misleading.||Positive|
|Lauber v. Lawrence & Morris||2017 WL 4164029 (N.D. Il) Case No. 16 C 11050||September 2017||Consumer brought action against law firm claiming that citation served upon consumer to discovery assets was false and misleading because it stated that consumer did not appear at hearing they could be subject to arrest. Court disagreed because specific language was substantially similar to what the state court forms authorized and it was not otherwise false.||Positive|
|Washington v. Brumbaugh & Quandahl, P.C., LLO.||2017 WL 4174754 (D. Ne) Case No. 8:15-CV-444||September 2017||Consumer sued law firm who, in an attempt to collect a debt, served discovery upon the consumer. Consumer claimed that law firm failed to inform consumer of her right to object but did advise consumer that discovery responses had to be sworn and filed. That instruction was misleading because that no such requirement exists under the court’s. Rules of Discovery.||Negative|
|White v. First Step Group LLC||2017 WL 4181121 (E.D. Ca) Case No. 2:16–cv–02439–KJM–GGH||September 2017||Consumer alleges that debt collector' collection letter failed to disclose the age of the debt, that payment of the debt could revive the statute of limitations, and use of the term settlement was misleading because it threatened legal action. Court found that consumer stated a claim on all counts.||Negative|
|Hart v. Credit Control, LLC||___F.3d___2017 WL 4216029 (6th Cir.) Case No. 16-17126||September 2017||Issue of first impression for the 11th Circuit was whether a voicemail left by a debt collector constitutes a “communication,” and what information will and will not constitute a “meaningful disclosure.” District Court found that a voice mail was not a communication and debt collector provided meaningful disclosure despite debt collector not identifying their name. Because voicemail was the initial communication and no disclosures were provided. Court found that voice mail was a communication and by failing to provide the disclosures was a violation of the FDCPA. However, Court found that meaningful disclosure was provided because name of the debt collection company and the nature of the company's business are disclosed.||Positive/Negative|
|Carla Diaz, Plaintiff, v. Midland Funding, LLC, Defendant.||2017 WL 4236060 (D. N.J.) Case No. 17-1925 (KM/JBC)||September 2017||Consumer alleged that debt buyer was not permitted to ask for attorney’s fees in state court action because in-house counsel was representing debt buyer and debt buyer showed four digits of SS# instead of three as required under NJ law. As to issue of attorney’s fees, Court disagrees because NJ Courts require parties to include fees as part of taxation of costs. As to the issue of the SS#, court refused to conclude that a violation of a NJ state court rule would be considered a unfair debt collection practice. Court also refused to find it unconscionable since the federal court allow 4 digits and even a disclosure of an entire SS# is not an unconscionable debt collection practice.||Positive|
|Margaret Broderick, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. Viking Client Services, Inc., Defendant.||2017 WL 4269962 (D.N.J.) Case No. 17-1827 (JLL)||September 2017||Collection agency included 1099C notice in its collection letters stating that forgiveness of debt over $600 will be reported and that "If the Settlement amount that you agreed to pay results in a discharge of $600 or more of the account principal balance due on the account, the creditor may be required to report that amount to the IRS via IRS Form 1099C" . Court found first sentence can be read as a definitive reporting requirement, while the second makes reporting seem like a potential, but not definite, occurrence. Additionally, the IRS reporting language fails to explain, in clear terms, whether the entire forgiven amount (including interest), or merely the stated principal balance, would be reported to the IRS if reporting is required.||Negative|
|Levins v. Healthcare Revenue Recovery Group, LLC||2017 WL 4269467 (D. N.J.) Case No. 1:17–cv–00928 (RBK/KMW)||September 2017||Consumer alleged that debt collector's voice mail violated the FDCPA because it failed to provide meaningful disclosure. Message was " ARS calling. Please return our call at 1–800–694–3048. ARS is a debt collector. This is an attempt to collect a debt. Any information obtained will be used for that purpose. Again, our number is 1–800–694–3048. " Court found it unmistakable that identification of entity was disclosed and that ARS abbreviated its name is not improper.||Positive|
|Peter Lundstedt, Plaintiff, v. I.C. System, Inc., Defendant.||2017 WL 4281057 (D. Ct) Case No. 3:15-cv-00824 (JAM)||September 2017||Debt collector made 29 calls to a consumer over 24 days, which court found was enough to state a claim under 1692d||Negative|
|Lorna Meyer, pleading on her own behalf and on behalf of all other similarly situated consumers, Plaintiff, v. Christus Health d/b/a TLRA Debt Recovery, Defendants.||2017 WL 4295233 (W.D. Tx) Case No. SA-17-CV-213-XR||September 2017||Consumer alleged violations of FDCPA pursuant to a collection letter and voice mail. As to the voice mail, debt collector identified itself as the collection division of a hospital. Court found that was sufficient meaningful disclosure. As to the letter, that part of letter is in bold and that letter asks consumer to call did not contradicts rights to dispute the debt.||Positive|
|Rosemary Abbott, Plaintiff, v. Second Round Sub, LLC, Defendant.||2017 WL 4296270 (W.D. N.Y.) Case No. 17-CV-336S||September 2017||Consumer sent letter to debt collector asking to cease communications but also verify the debt. Debt collector verified debt but also sent fraud packet. Consumer claims that sending fraud packet was beyond scope of waiver of C&D. 16982c(c) provides an exception to a C&D and permits solicitation of further information and a notice of a specific remedy that a debt collector might invoke.||Positive|
|Mary Mitchell, on behalf of herself and all other class members, Plaintiff, v. LVNV Funding, LLC; Resurgent Capital Services, L.P.; and ALEGIS GROUP, LLC, Defendants.||2017 WL 4303804 (N.D. In) Case No. 2:12-CV-523-TLS||September 2017||Court found that collections letters failed to advise consumer that debts were time-barred and thus violated FDCPA. However, Court also found that LVNV was not a debt collection pursuant to Henson v. Santander.||Positive/Negative|
|Lucille Simpson, on behalf of herself and the class members defined herein, Plaintiff, v. Safeguard Properties, LLC, Defendant.||2017 WL 4310674 (N.D. Ill) Case No. 13-CV-02453||September 2017||Company that provides contact and inspection services for a mortgage company left several door hangers on consumer's home to contact company. Mortgage was in default at the time. Company was sued for FDPCA violations. Whether company is a debt collector was a question of fact for the jury to determine whether they were indirectly collecting a debt.||Negative|
|Santora v. Capio Partners, LLC||2017 WL 4334128 (E.D. N.Y.) Case No. 16-cv-02788||September 2017||Initial demand letter also contained a 15-day settlement offer. Letter also stated that the settlement offer does not in any way affect the consumer's right to dispute within the 30 day period. Court found that settlement offer did not overshadow 1692g.||Positive|
|Bryan v. I.C. System Inc||2017 WL 4326041 (E.D.N.Y.) Case No. 15-cv-6984||September 2017||Defendant’s letter included a statement that the company had an A+ BBB rating, when its rating was not an A+. Consumer says this was material statement to a least sophisticated consumer dealing with a debt collector because debt collectors have a poor reputation and a high rating indicates that the collector can be trusted. Court disagreed. As a misrepresentation must either be misleading with respect to “the nature and legal status of the underlying debt” or “impede a consumer's ability to respond to or dispute collection,” to be actionable under the FDCPA, Plaintiff's allegations do not support an inference that the debt collection letter at issue in this action would be materially misleading to the least sophisticated consumer.||Positive|
|Steward v. CMRE Financial Services & Healthcare Revenue Management Group||2017 WL 4390102 (D. NV) Case No. 2:15-cv-00408-JAD-NJK||September 2017||Debt collector left 2 misdirected voicemails on consumer's phone, which were not meant for the consumer. Call was about a bill but it was not in default just delinquent. Court adopted the state-of-mind approach and it was clear from the evidence that debt was not in default. FDCPA does not apply to wrong-number voicemails left on consumer's phone because the FDCPA applies only to debts that are in default.||Positive|
|CFPB v. Weltman, Weinberg & Reis||2017 WL 4348916 (N.D. OH) Case No. 1:17 CV 817||September 2017||CFPB complaint stated a claim that law firm has misrepresented the level of attorney involvement when they sent out their demand letters. Court found that mere fact that a letter is written on law firm letterhead does not violate the FDCPA rather the question is whether WWR sufficiently clarified that it was not acting as an attorney in connection with sending the debt collection letters or making the debt collection phone calls, so as not to mislead. Those allegations alone are enough to sustain a claim. Court punted on issue of statute of limitations||Negative|
|Patterson v. Ray Klein, Inc||2017 WL 4369482 (D. OR) Case No. 6:16-cv-00578-AA||September 2017||Consumer alleged that by sending a communication which indicated that she could make payments online, when her ability to do so had already been deactivated was a violation of the FDCPA. Debt collector had an online portal for payments but when a case was put into suit consumer could only make payments by contacting the debt collector directly. Consumer was notified of that fact prior to the suit being filed. Nonetheless, consumer alleged that by not allowing her a choice to pay online was an FDCPA violation. Although letter contained a mere technical falsehood it was not likely to mislead the least sophisticated consumer.||Positive|
|Lavallee v. Med-1 Solutions||2017 WL 4340342 (S.D. IN) Case No. 1:15-cv-01922-DML-WTL||September 2017||Debt collector sent emails messages about her debt which required her to log to a portal and review a "secure" package which was information about her debt which contained a demand letter with a 1692g notice. The initial email did not contain such notice and it is undisputed that consumer did not click onto the "secure" package. Court found that debt collector violated FDCPA because it did not "send" the validation notice. The email itself did not contain the validation notice.||Negative|
|Thompson v. General Revenue Corp.||2017 WL 3276018 (S.D. Ohio)||August 2017||Collection agency was sent an account by the Ohio AG seeking to collect on a student loan. Letter sought principal balance and collection costs that had been certified by the AG. Consumer alleged that request for collection fees was a violation of 1692e(10). Agency argued that AG is granted discretion to assess collection costs and they are permitted to rely on AG's discretion. Court disagreed with Defendant and found that Ohio statute is not clear as to when AG can assess fees. Summary judgment was denied.||Negative|
|Diane Powers Plaintiff, v. Capital Management Services, L.P., Defendant.||2017 WL 3297997 (D. Or)||August 2017||Court found that debt collector is under no duty to disclose whether interest is accruing on the debt. Letter as not false or misleading.||Positive|
|Carmona v. Gene Kazlow, P.C.||2017 WL 3316091 (E.D. N.Y.)||August 2017||Attorney obtained judgments against consumer. After income execution, consumer filed an and obtained order to show cause (OTC) to vacate the judgment. While the hearing was pending consumer's account continued to be garnished. Consumer alleged that law firm had a duty to send sheriff OTC. Court disagreed. Under NY law its is up to the movant to assure a garnishment is stayed when an OTC has been filed.||Positive|
|Baye v. Midland Credit Management, Inc.||2017 WL 3425438 (E.D. La)||August 2017||Debt buyer sent collection letter with a disclosure that debt was too old to sue. Consumer sued debt buyer because letter failed to provide a disclosure that partial payment would restart the statute of limitations. Court, following the Boedicker case from Ks., found no such duty. Case was dismissed||Positive|
|Ozier v. Rev-1 Solution, LLC||2017 WL 3431838 (E.D. Wi)||August 2017||Debt collector was not under an affirmative duty to advise consumer that interest would not accrue on an account. FDCPA does not impose such an obligation.||Positive|
|Von Esch v. Legacy Salmon Creek Hospital and Asset Systems||2017 WL 3438378 (W.D. Wa)||August 2017||Debt collector sought prejudgment interest on a medical debt permissible under state law. Creditor did not seek the same amount during initial collection efforts. Court found no FDCPA violation for seeking to collect a different amount than was reported by the creditor especially if amount sought was permissible. If it were, every debt collector seeking to collect interest on an actual, accurate, liquidated sum would be violating the FDCPA. Further, FDCPA does not impose a duty on a debt collector to independently investigate creditor information. CFPB's outline of proposal suggests otherwise.||Positive|
|Afewerki v. Anaya Law Group||___F.3d ___2017 WL 3567829 (9th Cir)||August 2017||Law firm's misstate of amount owed in collection letter was material and subject to FDCPA liability. Case was reversed and remanded. Law firm cured defect after letters were sent so no state law claims. While right to cure has become a popular remedy for state law statues, it does not cure FDCPA claims.||Negative|
|Chernyakhovskaya, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. RESURGENT CAPITAL SERVICES L.P., AND LVNV FUNDING LLC, Defendants.||2017 WL 3593115 (D. NJ)||August 2017||LVNV was not a debt collector, pursuant to Henson v. Santander, because they had just purchased the account and then assigned to Resurgent to collection.||Positive|
|Dede Stratton, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Portfolio Recovery Associates, LLC, Defendant-Appellant.||2017 WL 3616383 (6th Cir)||August 2017||Second Appeal on issue of charging pre-judgment interest against debt buyer. During remand it was determined that credit agreement provided for Utah law and application of the choice-of-law provision was dispositive in this case. PRAA had the right to invoke Utah law in its Kentucky collection action and it was permissible under Utah law to seek prejudgment interest.||Positive|
|Hamilton, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. Midland Credit Management, Defendant||2017 WL 3705814 (S. D. Ca)||August 2017||Debt collection letter that stated debt was beyond statute of limitation, debt collector was not going to sue but that account could still be reported to the credit bureau did not violate FDCPA. Letter was not confusing on its face and debt collector was not required to include any clarifying information.||Positive|
|Ronald Friend, Plaintiff v. Financial Recoveries Limited, et al., Defendants||2017 WL 3701776 (M.D. Pa)||August 2017||Consumer sent dispute letters to agency due to the agency reporting of derogatory credit information to CRAs. Plaintiff alleged that agency was in violation of 1692g(a) & (b). The letters were unsolicited and agency was not actively seeking to collect on the debt nor did agency otherwise communicate with the consumer prior to these dispute letters. Court granted motion to dismiss as follows: (1) reporting derogatory information does not trigger requirements under 1692g(a) as it is not an initial communication and CRA is not a "person". Plaintiff’s Claim under 1692g(b) fails because there first needs to be communication triggered under 1692g(a). Plaintiff may have claim under 1692(e).||Positive|
|Demarais v. Gurstel Chargo, P.A.||2017 WL 3707437 (8th Cir)||August 2017||Law firm sued consumer who failed to respond to complaint. Rather than take default judgment, law firm when to trial to get judgment for failure to appear. However law firm did not bring any witnesses. Consumer showed with attorney and law firm dismissed the case. Thereafter law firm sent consumer discovery. Trial court dismissed but 8th Circuit reversed and remanded for further proceedings finding that law firm violated 1692e(5) and 1692f(1)||Negative|
|Laniado v. Certified Credit & Collection Bureau||2017 WL 3722712 (8th Cir)||August 2017||Agency sent two collection letters to consumer in less than 30 days. 1st letter was fully compliant with FDCPA and provided accurate validation disclosures. 2nd letter sent 20 days later demanding payment and for consumer to call if they felt there was a discrepancy. Circuit Court, following, Caprio, found that 2nd letter overshadowed because it would confuse the consumer not to dispute the debt in writing which is required under the FDCPA.||Negative|
|Ridgeway v. AR Resources||2017 WL 3736650 (D. NJ)||August 2017||NJ Court disagreed with Taylor Burns case involving RC Law Group. Whether credit repair agreement violated CROA has no impact on whether FDCPA was violated and even if consumer did not know whether letter was sent, CROA permits authorized agents to send letters to creditors. Summary Judgment was denied.||Negative|
|John Daubert v. NRA Group, LLC, d/b/a National Recovery Agency||2017 WL 2836808 (3d Cir)||July 2017||Debt collectors won judgment as a matter of law at a jury trial on issue of a visible bar code. Debt collector asserted a bona fide error defense on a mistake of law, stating that some districts courts had held that a bar code is not a violation of 1692f(8). Circuit Court disagreed and found that bona fide error, citing to Supreme Court decision in Jerman, that bona fide error does not apply to mistakes of law. Court reversed and remanded case to enter judgment in favor of consumer on FDCPA claim.||Negative|
|Taylor Stever, v. Michael S. Harrison||2017 WL 2869505 (D. NJ)||July 2017||Consumers (class action) claim that defendant law firm sent letters that revealed bar code through the envelope. Court found that class has stated an injury in fact, privacy concerns are the very injury that FDCPA was enacted to prevent.||Negative|
|Thurow v. Professional Finance Company, Inc.||2017 WL 2864936 (D. Co)||July 2017||Registered sex offender claims that debt collection served him a complaint at the wrong address and debt collector should have known his correct address because he was a on public sex offender list. Court disagreed. Plaintiff did not allege that debt collector know or should have known that service of the complaint was the wrong address. Case dismissed.||Positive|
|Salewske v. Trott & Trott||2017 WL 2888998 (E. D Mi)||July 2017||Law firm sent required notice in a foreclosure matter in full compliance with Michigan Law. Consumer alleged that notice violated FDCPA in that the notice was an attempt to collect a debt and it by publishing the notice it disclosed information to 3rd parties. Court found that complaint stated a claim. Although this was a foreclosure matter, law firm was in full compliance with the law but yet notice held to potentially violate FDCPA. Pre-emption was not argued properly and it will be interested to see whether this case is appealed.||Negative|
|Sayles v. Advanced Recovery Systems||2017 WL 2872343 (5th Cir)||July 2017||1692e(8) does not require that debt be disputed in writing. As long as debt collector knows or should have known that debt is being disputed, debt collector must report the debt as such.||Negative|
|Andy Rawlins v. Lyons, Doughty & Veldhuis, PC||2017 WL 2918917 (D. N.J.)||July 2017||Debt collector obtained judgment in NJ and believed consumer lived in NJ based on NJ driver’s license. Consumer actually lived in Massachusetts and the filing of the law suit in NJ was a violation of 1692i(a)(2).||Negative|
|Alexandra Jewsevskyj, on Behalf of Herself and All Others Similarly Situated, v. Financial Recovery Services, Inc.; LVNV Funding, LLC; Resurgent Capital Services, L.P.; Alegis Group, LLC||2017 WL 2992499 (3rd Cir)||July 2017||Claim that otherwise proper disclosures under FDCPA were in font size that was too small did not otherwise state a claim under the FDPCA||Positive|
|Taylor-Burns v. AR Resources, Inc.||2017 WL 3034353 (S. D. N.Y.)||July 2017||Consumer retained a credit report agency who in turn hired a law firm to bring an action against debt collector for failing to mark a debt as disputed. Court found that no valid contract existed between consumer and credit repair agency under Credit Repair Organization Act (CROA) and thus no contract existed with law firm as well. This is an important decision for anyone who has dealt with the RC Law Group. Court admonished this business model and found that RC Law Group violated various provisions of Rule of Professional Conduct as well.||Positive|
|David Coyne, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated v. Midland Funding, LLC, Midland Credit Management, and Messerli & Kramer, P.A.||2017 WL 3088374 (D. Minn)||July 2017||Letter which did not give a time frame to respond to a settlement offer was not a material violation of the FDPCA.||Positive|
|Lambe v. Allgate Financial, LLC||2017 WL 3115755 (S. D. Fl)||July 2017||Debt collector sued consumer in state court. Consumer filed a motion to dismissed and debt collector responded but did not state in its response that it was a debt collector. Consumer then sued under FDCPA. Court found that response to motion to dismiss was a pleading and an exception to 1692e(11)||Positive|
|Wheeler v. Midland et al||2017 WL 3235683 (N.D. Il)||July 2017||Plaintiff alleged that website information about debt did not inform consumer that debt was past the statute of limitations. Court held that Plaintiff stated a cause of action.||Negative|
|Cameau v. National Recovery Agency||2017 WL 2455084 (E.D.N.Y.)||June 2017||No FDCPA violation when one call was made and collector failed to identify name of employer pursuant to 1692d(6). This case is being highlighted because in discovery Plaintiff admitted that he received no call from the debt collector and his depositon testimony contradicted the allegations of the complaint. Plaintiff did not respond to the debt collectors summary judgment motion. It will be interestng to see whether debt collector will now being sanctions.||Positive|
|Infante v. Portfolio Recovery Associates, LLC||2017 WL 2445133 (E. D. Il)||June 2017||Motion for Sanctions denied when Plaintiff refused to dismiss case when debt buyer produced evidence that they reported debt as disputed. This case is being highlighted to show that no matter what the facts, debt collectors seem to never be sucessful in a Rule 11 motions. There seems to be two difference standards for inapproprioate conduct in litigation. One for consumers and one for debt collectors.||Negative|
|KRISTINA HUFFMAN v. BC SERVICES, INC.||2017 WL 2537106 (D. Co)||June 2017||Debt collector sent letter to consumer that stated balance was $0.00. Consumer alleged the letter was harassing. Court held that if there is no purported debt there cannot be debt collection activity.||Positive|
|Henson v. Santander Consumer USA Inc.||2017 WL 2507342 (U.S. Supreme Ct)||June 2017||Bank was not considered a debt collector because it was not collecting debts "due another". Court did not consider the principle purpose of the creditor. Readers of this decision should proceed with caustion. This was a very limited decision specific to the fact of this particulat case. This case does not stand for the proposition that all debt buyer are no longer debt collectors.||Positive|
|SCOTT GEBHARDT v. LJ ROSS ASSOCIATES||2017 WL 2562106 (D. NJ)||June 2017||Consumer's attorney sent C&D letter. Letter was signed for on 9/11 @ 9:58AM by debt's collector's employee in mail room and call was made to consumer on 10:10AM before letter was processed internally with debt collector. No further calls were made. Court held that employees signature on receipt of the letter could not be imputed upon debt collector. FDCPA requires the debt collector to have actual knowledge of an individual's legal representation prior to making a communication. Employee who just signed for the letter and who did not read the letter had no knowledge.||Positive|
|Beavers v. Midland Funding, LLC||2017 WL 2568918 (E.D.AK)||June 2017||FDCPA one year statute of limitations begins to run when lawsuit is filed, as opposed to date of service, because it can cause harm to the consumer at that time and collection can still continue after lawsuit if filed and before service of the complaint is made.||Positive|
|Thomas v. Grant & Weber, Inc.||2017 WL 2604253 (M.D. Ga)||June 2017||Court denied motion for default judgment and found that debt collectors letter which advised that payment may be construed as acknowledging the debt and that it could waive the statute of limitions was not a violation of the FDCPA.||Positive|
|Macias v. Credit Control, LLC||2017 WL 2619145 (N.D. IL)||June 2017||Plaintiff claims debt collector's violated 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692e and 1692f because it made a misleading or unfair representation by stating that negative credit information would be submitted to the CRAs, when in fact a credit report had already been submitted regarding the alleged debt and the state was meant solely to coerse payment. Court denied Plaintiff's allegation as debt collector is permitted to report the debt even if original creditor did as well.||Positive|
|Randall v. Paul||2017 WL 2628200 (Court of Appeals, MN)||June 2017||Attorney sent mechanic’s lien notice to homeowners which complied with MN state law but failed to provide mini-miranda notice. Trial court found no FDPCA violation but Appeals court reversed and remanded finding that a genuine issue of material fact existsed as to whether respondent's service of two mechanic's lien statements on appellants was “made in connection with the collection of any debt,”||Negative|
|SUZETTE WOOD v. MIDLAND FUNDING,||2017 WL 2703795 (6th Cir)||June 2017||Publication of service in compliance with Michigan State law was not a violation of the FDCPA. Debt collector made no false statements in the pulbicationn and the conduct was not intended to harass.||Positive|
|KEONTE GATHERS v. CAB COLLECTION AGENCY, INC.||2017 WL 2703686 (E.D. Va)||June 2017||Plaintiff's complaint failed to allege any conceivable harm for failing to mark a disputed debt as disputed under 1692e(8). Complaint was dismissed without prejudice. These two cases (2017 WL 2703686 (E.D. Va) and 2017 WL 2703685 (E.D. Va)) were consolidated. Decision and analysis were identical. There are numbers cases field under this theory and these decisions maybe very helpful, especially since the court seems to suggest somewhat of a heightened pleading standing to show actual harm.||Positive|
|OLIVER HOLMES v. CONTRACT CALLERS, INC.||2017 WL 2703685 (E.D. Va)||June 2017||Plaintiff's complaint failed to allege any conceivable harm for failing to mark a disputed debt as disputed under 1692e(8). Complaint was dismissed without prejudice. These two cases (2017 WL 2703686 (E.D. Va) and 2017 WL 2703685 (E.D. Va)) were consolidated. Decision and analysis were identical. There are numbers cases field under this theory and these decisions maybe very helpful, especially since the court seems to suggest somewhat of a heightened pleading standing to show actual harm.||Positive|
|Cottle v. Associated Credit Service, Inc.||2017 WL 2728206 (E.D. Wa)||June 2017||Consumers received copies of garnishments papers that contained their full social security numbers, however papers filed with the Court had the SS# redacted. No violation under 1692e(5)||Positive|
|VINCENT CARIERI v. MIDLAND CREDIT MANAGEMENT, INC.||2017 WL 2779750 (D. N.J.)||June 2017||FDCPA imposes no duty upon a debt collector to inform consumer that settlement may have tax consequences||Positive|
|Islam v. Credit Control, LLC||2017 WL 2788938 9E.D. N.Y.)||June 2017||No FDCPA violation when demand letter referred to original and current creditor as the same. Court found claims to be meritless. A good example of a arguable “frivolous” claim.||Positive|
|RAFAEL DISLA, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. NORTHSTAR LOCATION SERVICES, LLC; and JOHN DOES 1-25, Defendants.||2017 WL 2799691 (D. N.J.)||June 2017||Inclusion of 1099c lanaguage in a letter found to state a claim under 1692e. Letter said that whenever " $600.00 or more of a debt is forgiven as a result of settling a debt for less than the balance owed, it may be considered taxable income". Court found that least sophisticated consumer could understand this in two ways, that debt forgiveness must be reported only if it is taxable income or that creditor must always report forgiven debt even if it is not taxable income for the debtor. Lesson learned - don’t put 1099-c language in a letter.||Negative|
|Feldheim v. Financial Recovery Services, Inc.||2017 WL 2821550 (S.D. N.Y.)||June 2017||Settlement letter that stated " as of this date you owe____" did not infer or imply that balance would change, case was dismissed||Positive|
|Ecker v. Advantage Assets II, Inc.||2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 65615 (W.D. Pa)||May 2017||Debt collector made representations about judgment liens and collecting on a judgment. Court found that these facts supported consumer's claims under FDCPA that conversation implied wages could be garnished, which under PA Law is not permissible.||Negative|
|Sperber v. Cent. Credit Servs., LLC,||2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 66656 (E. D. N.Y.)||May 2017||Court, following the 2nd Circuit decision in Avila, found that consumer's complaint stated a claim against debt collector regarding failure to show that interest was accuring in demand letter. Even though debt collectors stated that it was not charging interest, that fact was premature for a motion for judgment on the pleadings. It was enough that consumer alleged facts sufficient to state a claim.||Negative|
|Ghanta v. Immediate Credit Recovery, Inc||2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67726 (N.D. Tx)||May 2017||Responding to a CFPB complaint disputing the debt and supplying verification through the CFPB portal is not sufficient to comply with the FDCPA. Statute requires that verification be mailed back to the consumer.||Negative|
|Barnett v. Healthcare Revenue Recovery Grp.,||2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68076 (S. D.In)||May 2017||Debt collection letter that fully disclosed that debt may be sold and that subsequent owner could credit report would not mislead the least sophistcated consumer.||Positive|
|O'Neill v. Northland Grp., Inc.,||2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67982 (D. N.J.)||May 2017||Consumer claimed that settlement letter offering a discounted amount was misleading because it would lead consumer to believe that it was a one-time offer, when in fact creditror was authorized to accept a range of settlement offers. Court disagreed and found that as a matter of law letter was not violative of the FDPCA||Positive|
|Dunbar v. Kohn Law Firm SC,||2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 69906 (E.D. Wi)||May 2017||Settlement letter which informed consumer of "tax consequences" if account was settled was not an FDPCA violation."Rather than being plausibly intimidating, the court finds the statement more likely to be helpful... An unsophisticated debtor might not recognize that the discharge of a debt constitutes income and therefore might have tax consequences. Taxes are complicated. Absent being alerted that a settlement might affect her taxes, a debtor might mistakenly believe that her net savings by accepting a settlement will be greater than they actually turn out to be."||Positive|
|Schultz v. Midland Credit Mgmt.,||2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70588 (D.N.J.)||May 2017||Collections letters included statement: “We are not obligated to renew this offer. We will report forgiveness of debt as required by [the Internal Revenue Services'] regulations. Reporting is not required every time a debt is canceled or settled, and might not be required in your case." Court found statement did not violate FDCPA. Court stated that statement clearly shows that Defendant made no affirmative statement of law, let alone a misstatement.||Positive|
|Rodriguez v. IC Sys.||2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73119 (W.D Tx)||May 2017||Plainiff filed a notice of voluntary dismissal when Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment. Defendant filed for sanctions. Court found that case was not filed in bad faith but that Plaintiff was "sluggish" in prosecuting the case. Court denied sanctions and attorneys fees but awarded costs.||Positive|
|Midland Funding LLC v. Johnson||2017 U.S. LEXIS 2949 (Supreme Court)||May 2017||Filing an out of stat proof of claim is not a violation of the FDCPA||Positive|
|Hillbeck v. Accounts Receivable Servs., LLC||2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73885 (D. Minn)||May 2017||Statement by representative of debt collector in court while techicially not correct was not material to warrant FDPCA violation.||Positive|
|Damm v. Woods & Bates||2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 75641 (C.D.IL)||May 2017||Consumer's complaint alleges that debt collector's initial demand letter debt collect failed to state requried language in 1692e(11), along with mini miranda. Court disagreed, to mandate that requirement would make 1692e(11) superfluous.||Positive|
|Taylor v. Fin. Recovery Servs.,||2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76243 (S.D.N.Y.)||May 2017||Collection letters which stated same balance mulitple times in one letter and in subsequent letters, where amounts remained unchanged, did not violate FDCPA because they did not otherwise disclose whether interest was accruing. Also statements about tax consequences did not violate the Act||Positive|
|Dorrian v. LVNV Fundng||2017 Mass Super. LEXIS 34||May 2017||Issue as to whether passive debt buyer was required to obtain a license under state law. Mass Superior Court held that passive debtor is collecting debt indirectly and was required to get a license. However, prior advisory opinion from state regulatory body which stated that a license was not required was enough not to void the judgments and the accounts. However failure to get a license was an FDCPA violation and enough to obtain class certification .||Negative|
|Nepomuceno v. Midland Credit Mgmt.||2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 79307 (D. NJ) 5/24/2017||May 2017||Inclusion of a due date on a collection letters was not confusing to the least sophisticated consumer in light of the letter as a whole. However, claims that debt buyer lacked license to collect interest were sustained. Issue of licensing seems to be trending in the courts.||Positive/Negative|
|IN RE: ANGELA YVONNE HOLYFIELD, Debtor. ANGELA YVONNE HOLYFIELD, Plaintiff, v. ALDRIDGE PITE, LLP, Defendant.||2017 WL 2274939 (N. D. GA, Bankruptcy Court)||May 2017||1692e(11) does not require that the word "debt collector" in the disclosure as long as the consumer understands the communication is used as an attempt to collect a debt. This case highlights issues for debt buyers, as well as the parties, in reguards to licensing.||Positive|
|Genova v. IC Sys.,||2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 80046 (D N.J.)||May 2017||Inclusion of collection fees that were not already incurred was a violation of 1692f(1)||Negative|
|Kaiser v. Cascade Capital LLC||2017 WL 2332856 (D. Or)||May 2017||The court concluded that failure to notify the consumer that the debt is subject to two possible statute of limitations violates the FDCPA. Debt collector was seeking a deficiency balance on an auto loan. Issue was whether 4 year or 6 year statute applied based on whether you follow UCC, disposition of secured collateral or straight breach of contract. Court said debt collector had duty to notify consumer of all the possible statute of limitations.||Negative|
|Hennings v. Alltran Fin.,||2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 81289 (E.D. Wi)||May 2017||Allegation that debt collector knew or should have known that debt was not owed by consumer was sufificent to state a claim under FDCPA. Debt collectors defense that it had a right to rely on client information is irrelevant for purposes of a motion to dismiss and better argued in later stage of proceedings.||Negative|
|ALI JUDAH, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. TOTAL CARD, INC. & JOHN DOES 1-25, Defendants.||2017 WL 2345636 (D. N.J.)||May 2017||No FDCPA liablity on collection letter that offered settlement options on time-barred debt, because in NJ a debt cannot be revived unless consumer makes a written, unconditional promise to pay the full debt.||Positive|
|Smith v. Weltman, Weinberg & Reis Co., L.P.A.||2017 WL 2345600 (S. D. Il)||May 2017||Collection letter seeking consumer to consider tax refund to settle debt with language that said, " settlement could have tax consequences" was not false & misleading.||Positive|
|Knight v. Credit Prot. Ass'n., L.P.,||2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 50434 (E.D. N.Y.)||April 2017||Statement in debt collection that said, "the thirty (30) day validation period concerning the validity of your debt has now passed without you seeking to verify the debt" was false and misleading because it inferred that it was the responsibility of the consumer to verifiy the debt, that the debt is valid and that consumer had no more opportunties to dispute the debt.||Negative|
|Cetak v. Nat'l Credit Adjusters, LLC||2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51230 (D. NE)||April 2017||Consumer alleges that debt collector failed to get written authorization to withdraw money from her bank account in violation of EFTA and FDCPA. Court found complaint stated a claim for EFTA but not FDCPA. Court found that 1691f(1) is on the amount of the debt collected rather than the authorization to collection. Since Plaintiff did not allege that debt collector took more than what was supposed to be taken, no FDPCA claim.||Positive|
|Scott v. E. Hope Greenberg||2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 50822 (E.D.N.Y.)||April 2017||Court found that equitable tolling to the statute of limitations applied where it was alleged that debt collector fraudulently concealed information to consumer about her necessity to appear in court.||Negative|
|Collopy v. Dynamic Recovery Solutions, LLC||2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51606 (N.D. Il)||April 2017||Letter with statute of limitations disclosure but offered payment options found to state a claim under the FDCPA, because did not disclose revival information. There have been many of these cases which raises a serious red flag and begs the question of whether you can collect on out of stat debt at all.||Negative|
|Darrisaw v. Pa. Higher Educ. Assistance Agency (PHEAA),||2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55351 (S. D. Ga)||April 2017||Pheea's status as a guaranty agency places it in a fiduciary relationship to the ED, and therefore the agency falls within the fiduciary exception to the term "debt collector" under the FDCPA||Positive|
|Flecha v. Medicredit, Inc.||2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 54814 (W.D. Tx)||April 2017||Consumer alleged that agency's collection letter was an implicit threat of litigation and thus false because creditor does not sue, by use of the terms "a determination must be made as to the disposition of your account" along with the statement "voluntary resolution is doubtful".||Negative|
|Aker v. Americollect, Inc.,||2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 6342 (7th Cir)||April 2017||Debt collector was entitled to seek state stautory interest because they had sought and obtained permission from state regulatory to do so. Debt also arose under state law which allowed for demand of interest before debt has been reduced to judgment.||Positive|
|Vanhuss v. Rausch, Sturm, Israel, Enerson & Hornik||2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57335 (W. D. Wi)||April 2017||Lawfirm's bona fide error defense is a genuie issue of fact and summary judgment motion denied. Law firm failed to validate before it filed a law suit. Evidence was not sufficient to show that law firm either had reasonable procedures or reasonable precaustions to prevent the error. Here, a dispute sent by certified mail was lost and not logged, defendants failed to povide any description or documentation of its methods for training its mailroom employees to recognize those letters when they arrive at the firm or account for all mail received.||Negative|
|Cordova v. Jenkins,||2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 60308 (D. N.M.)||April 2017||Law firm obtained default judgment against consumer and submitted attorney fee affidavits, which consumer alleges that the substance of the affidavits where false. Similar affidavits in other cases were identical and Plaintiff alleges that the work was not performed by the attorney but support staff. Court denied motion to dismiss. This case is of a concern because it gives consumers a 2nd bite of the apple after a default judgment has been entered as well as sets up problems for what is appropriate recovery of attorney’s fees.||Negative|
|Lyshe v. Levy,||2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 6855 (6th Cir)||April 2017||Consumer lacked standing to bring FDPCA case based upon misstatement about discovery requests,that they had to be notarized and that electronic copies would only be served upon request. Such requests did not violate state law of civil procedure||Positive|
|Miran v. Convergent Outsourcing, Inc.||2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 60685 (S.D.Ca)||April 2017||Collection letter on out of stat debt was not false or misleading where debt collector provided a disclosure. Further consumer alleged that letter amounted to a novation (new agreement) if accepted. Court found that consumer failed to plead such a claim.||Positive|
|Harney v. Kramer & Frank, P.C.,||2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61968 (E.D. Mo)||April 2017||Collection of water and sewer charges meet the definition of a debt under the FDCPA as well as qualify as transaction under the definition of 1692a(5).||Negative|
|Velez v. Healthcare Revenue Recovery Grp., LLC||2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61410 (M.D.N.C.)||April 2017||Consumer alleged that the use of the ARS was not the true name of Health Revene Revenue Corp (HRRG) and thus a violation of 1692e(14). Court disagreed and dismissed complaint with prejudice as to that count because ARS was registered as a ficitious name. Use of the name ARS was not false or deceptive as well.||Positive|
|Betz v. MRS BPO, LLC||2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63236 (E.D. Wi)||April 2017||Consumer alleged that settlement offer made initial demand letter was confusing in light of 1692g disclosures. Court disagreed. The FDCPA allows the debt collector to continue attempts to collect the debt during the 30-day validation period unless and until the consumer requests validation. It would be absurd to interpret the act as forbidding the debt collector from taking the more benign step of making the consumer a settlement offer during that period.||Positive|
|Riazzi v. Weltman, Weinberg & Reis Co., LPA||2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64897 (W.D. Pa)||April 2017||No FDCPA violation where lawfirm sent out post judgment discovery which was not in compliance with state civil procedure rules. Court found that there was no threatened "action" because the lawsuit "action" had already been initiated, there was no allegation that amount of the debt was inaccurately stated. Lawfirm's actions are not the type of illegal act the FDCPA prohibits because the communication at issue did not violate a relevant, material provision of the statute.||Positive|
|Cannon v. United Guar. Residential Ins. Co.,||2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29449 (S. D. In)||March 2017||Mortgage insurer who was a subrogee of Wells Fargo and under terms of mortgage insurance policy was permitted to seek recovery from consumer in the amount of policy paid to Wells. Because United was collecting what was owed to them in their own name, court found they were not a debt collector.||Positive|
|Perez v. Budget Control Servs||2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30337 (D. Co)||March 2017||Bar code visible through a window envelope was not a FDPCA violation. Court found that a literal reading of 1692f(8) would lead to the absurd conclusion that placing anything other than the debt collector's address on the envelope violates the statute. Such a strict reading would prevent the sender from including the recipient's address. This result is nonsensical because the FDCPA is clearly intended to allow debt collectors to continue to send mailings, subject to certain restrictions on abusive practices.||Positive|
|Dash v. Midland Funding LLC,||2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30063 (M.D. Fl)||March 2017||Failure to follow Metro 2 guidelines is not a per se FDCPA violation||Positive|
|Bednarski v. Potestivo & Assocs., P.C||2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32522 (N.D. Il)||March 2017||Law firm hired by Fed Gov't to collect student loan is not entitled to qualified immunity for alleged claims under the FDCPA. Although no violation for using a signature block of AG, similar to that in Sheriff v. Gillie, court felt that remainder of letter was confusing and thus stated a claim under FDCPA||Negative|
|Mahjub v. Rent Recover of Better NOI, LLC||2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33653 (N.D.Il)||March 2017||Court critiques and does not follows Marx v. General Revenue Services analysis in determining what is a communication under the FDCPA. District Court here finds that it does not matter what the recipient believes the purpose of the communication is (i.e. to collect the debt) the fact that the communication is made is enough. Here fax sent to employer about employment for purposes of an alleged debt was a communication and thus stated a claim under the FDCPA.||Negative|
|Cummings v. Jaburg & Wilk, P.C||2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36316 (D. Az)||March 2017||Law firm collecting a student loan debt, inadvertently forgot to include a $20.00 late charge and amended its complaint to include that amount. Court dismissed FDCPA case holding that failure to include the charge was immaterial.||Positive|
|Ruge v. Delta Outsource Group, Inc.||2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35047 (N.D. Il)||March 2017||Collection letter to consumer stated that "Because of interest, late charges, or other charges that may vary from day to day, the amount due on the day you pay may be greater." However, agency did not add any interest and never intended to. Court found that agency's letter was material false and in violation of 1692e, 1692e(2)(A) and 1692e(10) and summary judgment was granted in favor of consumer.||Negative|
|Remington v. Fin. Recovery Servs.,||2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36637 (D. Ct)||March 2017||Collection letter that included tax language" this settlement may have tax consequences" was not false and not a violation of the FDCPA||Positive|
|Truffin v. Moss||2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37726 (W.D. Tx)||March 2017||Consumer failed to timely dispute the debt after receipt of a demand letter. Law firm filed suit in state court and when served with the Complaint, consumer then disputed. Consumer then sued law firm stating that law firm failed to properly validate the debt and cease collection activity. Court granted law firm motion to dismiss holding that consumer had no claim under FDCPA because consumer did not timely dispute.||Positive|
|Pollak v. Firstsource Advantage, LLC||2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37520 (D. NJ)||March 2017||Settlement letters from collection agency contained name and telephone of creditors. When the consumer called debt collectors, they identified themselves as the creditor when in fact they were the debt collector. Consumer said this was false and misleading and the court agreed stating it would likely deceive the least sophisticated consumer. Motion to dismiss denied.||Negative|
|Pittman v. Jefferson Capital Sys||2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38484 (S. D. In.)||March 2017||Time barred debt disclosure found misleading because it claimed that payment could "aid" in consumer financial condition. Also Defendants' asserted that disclosure language mirrored consent order in Asset Acceptance case. Court disagreed an even if it did it had no effect on whether statements made in this case otherwise violated the FDCPA.||Negative|
|Nyberg v. Portfolio Recovery Assocs.||2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 39482 (D. Or)||March 2017||No FDCPA violation for bringing state court action for an account stated||Positive|
|Kassin v. AR Res., Inc||2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 41187 (D. NJ)||March 2017||Medical collection letter directed consumer to call debt collector in the event debt was covered by insurance along with mini Miranda warning. Court found that the statement in regard to Plaintiff's insurance plan, as alleged, may reasonably be interpreted to suggest that the debt could be disputed only by calling Defendant.||Negative|
|Hochberg v. Lenox, Socey, Formidoni, Giordano, Cooley, Lang & Casey, P.C||2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43105 (D. NJ)||March 2017||Debt collector sued husband and wife for medical debt of wife. Court found that complaint stated a claim under FDPCA, because even though NJ recognizes doctrine of necessaries, complaint was objectively false because it said husband was directly liable for the debt.||Negative|
|Shields v. J.C. Christensen & Assocs.||2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43039 (D. In)||March 2017||Collection letter that advised that the debt buyer could not sue on the debt contradicted remainder of letter because it did not reference the collection agency and did not advise that payment would revive the state. Letter stated a claim under the FDCPA.||Negative|
|Holcomb v. Freedman Anselmo Lindberg, LLC||2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42990 (N.D. Il)||March 2017||Law firm sent court filings to consumer directly even though she had an attorney. Though attorney had not formally entered his appearance there was sufficient knowledge that consumer was represented. Summary judgment in favor of consumer||Negative.|
|Pisarz v. GC Servs., L.P.,||2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42880 (D. NJ)||March 2017||A claim under 1692d(6) must be made upon more than one call. A single call to a consumer, under this section of the FDCPA, is not harassment.||Positive|
|St. Pierre v. Retrieval-Masters Retrieval-Masters, Inc.,||2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42875 (D. NJ)||March 2017||Debts which were incurred as the result of failing to pay for EZPass (tolls) were not subject to the FDCPA. Debt obligation arose out of NJ state law and penalties for failure to pay fall outside the FDCPA.||Positive|
|Gordon v. Syndicated Office Sys.||2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43811 (N.D.IL)||March 2017||Court held there is no continuing duty to advise CRA that a debt has been disputed, even when the dispute occurs after the debt collector reports the debt. No violation under 1692e(8).||Positive|
|Latour v. Lustig, Glaser & Wilson, PC.,||2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 46647 (D. MA)||March 2017||Letter sent to consumer after law suit was filed in an attempt to resolve was not false and misleading under the FDPCA.||Positive|
|Carlin v. Davidson Fink LLP,||2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 5438 (2nd Cir)||March 2017||Notice attached to foreclosure complaint is a pleading and not subject to 1692g. However, payoff statement which states that "total amount due' may include estimated fees and costs can violate the FDCPA and court urges debt collectors to be more specific about those costs in light of the purpose of the payoff statement.||Positive|
|Pantoja v. Portfolio Recovery Assocs., LLC||2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 5432 (7th Cir)||March 2017||Letter which failed to advise consumer that debt buyer could not sue on the debt and that payment could revive the debt was a violation of the FDPCA||Negative|
|Smith v. Nat'l Enter. Sys.||2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 47701 (W.D. Ok)||March 2017||Collection letter which stated "how much you save" by accepting a settlement was not false and misleading for failing to advise of tax consequences.||Positive|
|Stennett v. Midland Funding||2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 47320 (W.D. Ky)||March 2017||SOL for FDCPA claim begins to run on a discrete, act. Violation here was the filing of a judgment lien. The continuation of that lien was not a discrete act and thus FDPCA claim was time barred.||Positive|
|Cuenca v. Harris & Harris, Ltd.||2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 49548 (N.D. Il)||March 2017||Statement that debt collector "may exercise their various options to enforce collection" can be construed by the least sophisticated consumer to be a threat of litigation. Court found not necessary to resolve whether statement is a threat rather whether statement would likely mislead an objective unsophisticated consumer about the possibility that she would get sued. Motion to dismiss denied.||Negative|
|Johnson v. Admiral Invs., LLC||2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15483 (D. Minn)||February 2017||District Court adopted competent lawyer standard and found letter sent to consumer's lawyer was not actionable.||Positive|
|Cortellessa v. Udren Law Offices P.C.,||2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15213(E.D. Pa)||February 2017||Using an ambiguous title for an itemized portion of debt calculation (Corporate Advance Balance) is immaterial and not an FDCPA violation||Positive|
|Palmer v. Enhanced Recovery Co. LLC||2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18338 (E.D. Pa)||February 2017||Prior settlement of FDCPA claims due to a written communication precluded Plaintiff from asserted another FDCPA claim from a prior telephone call.||Positive|
|Rogers v. Overton||2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19734 (N.D. N.Y.)||February 2017||Consumer claims that debt collector violated 1692e(8) by failing to mark a disputed debt as disputed after the account had already been reported. Court found that debt collector owes no affirmative post-reporting duty to communicate a dispute that arises after the debt has been reported, citing FTC commentary. This is a clear departure from existing practice.||Positive|
|Klein v. Credit Prot. Ass'n||2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21391 (E.D. Mo)||February 2017||Consumer brought class action claiming debt collector violated 1692e(11). When received a copy of his credit report which included the subject debt. Consumer called debt collector and first got recorded message that told consumer that if they wanted to speak to a collection specialist they had to hang up and call another number. There was no mini miranda warning. Court held that communication was not an attempt to collect a debt because consumer initiated call. Message was not specific to consumer's debt.||Positive|
|Mikolajczyk v. Universal Fid., LP,||2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24587 (E.D. Wi)||February 2017||Debt collector's initial demand letter had a check box to indicate whether consumer was disputing the debt with four blank lines where the consumer was required to explain why the debt was disputed. Making explanation for a dispute required in order to dispute violates the states, as a consumer isn ot reuqired to provide any reason for a dispute and thuse it was a false and deceptive means in which to collect a debt as well as a potential overshadowing of 1692g.||Negative|
|Fausz v. Npas, Inc.||2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24306 (W. D. Ky)||February 2017||Whether a debt is in default is determined by the debt holder. In this case debt was sent to a collection agency and then subsequently sent to an "early-out vendor" who usually does not colelct on accounts in "default". Because hospital had already deemed debt in default wheni t sent ot the collection agency, the default staus of the debt is not eliminated just because servicer does not normally collect on defaulted debts. This case can be viewed as both positive and negative. Positive in that court upheld amjority view that debt holder determines the default status. Negative in that services need to be very careful about accepting accounts from creditor where there has been no prior determination of default.||Negative|
|Hinderstein v. Advanced Call Ctr. Techs.||2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27267 (C.D. Ca)||February 2017||49 calls in 18 days where consumer did nto answer any of the calls and no message was left did not violate 1692d, and no evidence of intent to harass.||Positive|
|Madden v. Midland Funding||2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27109 (S. D. N.Y.)||February 2017||On remand, back to District Court was left to decided whether the Delaware choice-of-law clause precludes Madden's claims even thorugh National Bank Act did not pre-empt stte law usury claims. Denial of Class cert was also reversed by 2nd Cirucit. DIstrict Court found that Delware Choice of law dictates thatr New York law applies thre was no claim for criminal usury becauswe no private right of action, but FDCPA claims survive under NY law and class was certified.||Negative|
|Bryant v. Kass Shuler, P.A.||2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27811 (S.D. FL)||February 2017||Consumer claimsed that law firm made a false or misleading statement by virtue of the Summons stating that consumer had 30 days to respond to the Complaint when the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure only provide for 20 days. Court found the discrepancy not material and thus no violation of the FDCPA.||Positive|
|Benali v. Afni, Inc.||2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 783 (D. N.J.)||January 2017||Collection letter stated that processing may be charged if using a credit card. Plaintiff alleged charging a fee that was no authorized by contract was a violation of FDCPA. Court found that since no processing fee was in fact charged, because consumer made no payment, there was no harm (Spokeo) and thus no violation of the FDCPA||Positive|
|Hawksley v. Weltman, Weinberg & Reis Co., P.S.C.||2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1233 (D. Ky)||January 2017||In filing a post judgment notice of lien, law firm added costs ($113.50) that were not yet specifically awarded by the court, althought judgment included "costs". LIsting costs without approval by the Court was in violation of Kentucky law and thus states a claim for an FDCPA violation because it misrepresented the amount of debt.||Negative|
|Motes v. Midland Funding, LLC||2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1867 (N. D. Al)||January 2017||Law firm sued consumer and lost at trial. Consumer alleges that law firm and debt buyer should have know that debt was not consumer's and should not have sued. Court found a triable issue of fact and summary judgment denied. Futher although lawfirm and debt buyer put forth bona fide erroe defense and proved that error was not intentional and there were procedures in place to avoid errors, court found that procedures did not "reasonably adapted to avoid readily discovable errors", and thus failed to prove last element of the defense.||Negative|
|Reed v. IC Sys.||2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3239 (W.D. Pa)||January 2017||Court granted summary judgment for debt collection and found that no reasonable jury could infer that Defendant acted with the intent to "annoy, abuse, or harass" when 125 calls in 135, many of which were not answered and there was no communication with the Plaintiff.||Positive|
|Burns v. Seterus, Inc.||2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4106 (W. D. N.Y.)||January 2017||Mortgage servicer sent letter informing of forced place insurance, which included a mini-miranda warning. Letter did not ask for any payment. Court found that letter was not subject to the FDCPA||Positive|
|Mashiri v. Epsten Grinnell & Howell,||2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 665 (9th Cir.)||January 2017||Law firm attempting to collect a debt on behalf of HOA is subject to full scope of the FDCPA, irrespective of whether it sought to perfect HOA security interest||Negative|
|Green v. Specialized Loan Servicing||2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7012 (E.D. Wi)||January 2017||The sending of a notice of a transfer of servicer, a request for information regarding credit reporting and a verification fax were not attempts to collect a debt and not subject to the FDCPA||Positive|
|Garcia v. Midland Funding Llc||2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6895 (D. N.J.)||January 2017||Demand for attorneys fees in state court complaint was permissible under state law and not a violation of the FDCPA||Positive|
|Motes v. Midland Funding, LLC,||2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6682 (N.D. Al)||January 2017||Court found no 1692(d) violation against debt buyerwho brought suit in state court and went to trial but did not calle a live witness.||Positive|
|Brandon v. Eaton Group Attys., LLC||2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9525 (E. D. La)||January 2017||Lawfirm sent a letter seeking a voluntary repayment plan also included a partially completed consent judgment with a term that consumer "acknowledge the debt". Court found this to be misleading because unsuspecting consumer could be fooled to signing a judgment when on voluntary payment plan was sought.||Negative|
|Csircsu v. Williams & Fudge, Inc.,||2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9253 (E.D. Mi)||January 2017||Debt collector won summary judgment on bona fide error defense. Account was placed with debt collector for a 2nd time after a C&D but social security number was misreported. Court found violation was unintentional and since creditor made the error when it placed the account and there was nothing to suggest that debtor collector should have know the social security number was incorrect. Court found it was reasonable for debt collector to rely on creditor's information and there were reasonable procedures in place to avoid sending a letter in the event of a C&D. That a letter was sent was not the debt collector's error.||Positive|
|Koby v. ARS Nat'l Servs||2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 1317 (9th Cir)||January 2017||Appeal of an approval of a class action where 4 million consumers were only provided injunctive relief while Plaintiff and counsel received monetary awards. Appeals court found that magstrate judge exceeded authority to approve class settled without approval of the class||Positive|
|Johnston v. Midland Credit Mgmt.||2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10610 (W.D. Mi)||January 2017||Settlement letter incorrectly stated that one settlement option was a zero-dollar payment option. When consumer accepted that offer, debt collector advised it was a mistake, Consumer sued and court found no FDCPA violation but no harm and no plausible claim for relief||Positive|
|Billie v. Credit Collection Servs||2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11979 (D. Ct)||January 2017||Allegation that debt was for personal, family and household use was not sufficient to state a claim under the FDCPA. Complaint dismissed with leave to amend||Positive|
|Boedicker v. Midland Credit Management||District Court (KS)||December 2016||The Court found that a letter that offered payment options, disclosed that the account was past statute of limitations, did not use the term “settle” or “settlement” but did not otherwise disclose that payment could revive the debt was not deceptive under FDCPA.||Positive|
|Smothers v. Midland Credit Management||District Court (KS)||December 2016||The Court found that the failure to disclose that payment could revive the debt with a time-barred debt disclosure could be confusing to the least sophisticated consumer.||Negative|
|Valentine v. Midland Funding, LLC||District Court (MO)||December 2016||The Court ruled that costs added by debt collector after default judgment and not associated with underlying account stated a claim for a FDCPA violation.||Negative|
|Nunez v. Pinnacle Credit Services, LLC||District Court (NY)||December 2016||The Court ruled it is not a FDCPA violation to delegate disputes to a third party. Passive debt buyer advised consumer that she should dispute account to their servicer.||Positive|
|Liang v. Frontline Asset Strategies, LLC||District Court (IL)||December 2016||The Court ruled that the failure to disclose that a judgment was dormant was not a violation of the FDCPA.||Positive|
|Frankowski v. Nathanson||District Court (MI)||December 2016||The Court ruled that a NSF fee can be considered a debt under the FDCPA.||Positive|
|Essique v. Walnut Woods Condominium Association||District Court (MI)||December 2016||Law firm included a statement of account with validation letter. When debtor disputed the debt, law firm continued collection activity and then subsequently verified the debt. The Court ruled against law firm on issue of whether the act of sending ledger satisfies 1692g(b) requirement of FDCPA.||Negative|
|Janetos v. Fulton Friedman & Gullace, LLP||District Court (IL)||December 2016||Remanded from the 7th Circuit to the District Court for the Northern District of Illinois on issue of debt buyer’s liability for law firm’s violation of FDCPA. Although law firm is now insolvent, plaintiff can use the net worth of debt buyer to determine damages.||Negative|
|Miran v. Convergent Outsourcing, Inc.||District Court (CA)||December 2016||The Court ruled that a statute of limitation disclosure in a settlement letter was not confusing to a consumer and was not a FDCPA violation, and the debt collector had no duty to advise that acceptance of the settlement offer operated as a novation.||Positive|
|Anderson v. Portfolio Recovery Associates, LLC||District Court (MO)||December 2016||Debt buyer was prevailing party winning on a summary judgment that was unopposed. The Court refused to grant attorneys’ fees under §1927.||Negative|
|Kaymark v. Udren Law Offices, P.C.||District Court (PA)||December 2016||Case on issues of whether a law firm violated the FDCPA when it alleged in a foreclosure complaint amounts that were not yet incurred was heard before the 3rd Circuit and remanded back to the District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania. The law firm argued materiality under Jensen but the Court rejected that argument.||Negative|
|Long v. Fenton & McGarvey Law Firm P.S.C.||District Court (IN)||December 2016||Consumer alleged that collection letter was confusing and misleading because it did not explain debt buyer’s relationship to the debt, the distinction between debt buyer and original creditor, and why the law firm was retained to collect. The Court ruled that there was a valid claim for a FDCPA violation because a violation of 1692g is a question of fact.||Negative|
|Carney v. Unifund CCR, LLC||District Court (MN)||December 2016||The Court found that a law firm did not commit a FDCPA violation by proceeding with garnishment even though consumer filed a claim exemption, as no determination had been made that funds were exempt. Further representation about knowledge of exempt funds were made to the Court and not the consumer.||Positive|
|Chisholm v. AFNI, Inc.||District Court (NJ)||November 2016||Court ruled that 17 calls by a debt collector that were unanswered, and one call where the recipient hung up, unaccompanied by any harsh or threatening language or back-to-back calls, within a 2-week period were not an FDCPA violation.||Positive|
|Ensminger v. Fair Collections & Outsourcing, Inc.||District Court (KS)||November 2016||Court ruled that a Kansas debt collection letter contained the Massachusetts disclosure on calls to employer but did not explain that it did not apply to Kansas residents.||Negative|
|Urquiaga v. Financial Business & Consumer Solutions, Inc.||District Court (FL)||November 2016||Court held that use of a fictitious name of a corporation that was not registered in the state was a false misrepresentation and thus stated a claim under the FDCPA.||Negative|
|Paz v. Portfolio Recovery Associates||District Court (IL)||November 2016||Court ruled that a letter from debtor’s attorney was enough to put debt collector on notice that debt was disputed, and the FDCPA was violated when the account was subsequently reported to credit bureaus without noting that the debt was disputed.||Negative|
|Sanchez v. Jackson||District Court (Il)||November 2016||Attorney attempted to argue that initial letter was sent on behalf of his client and that the FDCPA did not apply to him. Court denied and found validation notice was deficient because it failed to include statutory 1692g language.||Negative|
|Wilkins v. Accounts Receivable Resources, Inc.||District Court (FL)||November 2016||Court ruled that a demand letter that referred to current debt and previous debts, but only provided validation notice for current debt, was not a FDCPA violation.||Positive|
|Blaha v. First National Collection Bureau, Inc.||District Court (NJ)||November 2016||Court held that debt collector not required to provide disclosure that payment on time-barred debt would restart statute of limitations. However the Court found that the consumer stated a claim that the debt collector failed to disclose that the debt was time-barred and not legally enforceable, thus violation 1692e(2)(A).||Negative|
|Lopera v. Midland Credit Management||District Court (FL)||November 2016||Court found plaintiffs stated a claim under FDCPA when demand letter failed to advise consumer that debt was time-barred and that payment would revive the debt.||Negative|
|Huebner v. Midland Credit Management||District Court (NY)||November 2016||Counsel for Midland moved and was granted sanctions and attorneys’ fees by the Court against consumer’s attorney for unnecessary and protracted litigation.||Positive|
|Agrelo v. Affinity Management Services, LLC||11th Circuit||November 2016||Court held that a fine imposed by HOA on resident was a debt for purposes of FDCPA and Florida law, and attempts to collect when resident had counsel was a violation of the FDCPA.||Negative|
|Jones v. Hospital of Morristown||District Court (TN)||November 2016||Consumer brought FDCPA claims against hospital and law firm who filed suit in state court and obtained default judgment with attorneys’ fees. Court dismissed claims under Rooker Feldman FDCPA case as an attempt to re-litigate state court action.||Positive|
|Artell v. ARS National Services||District Court (FL)||November 2016||Court for the Southern District of Florida found a benign language exception for the use of a bar code visible through an envelope.||Positive|
|Curry v. AR Resources, Inc.||District Court (NJ)||November 2016||Court held that sending identical validation notices within 30 days of each other did not mislead the consumer.||Positive|
|Ocampo v. Professional Claims Bureau, Inc.||District Court (NY)||November 2016||Bench trial on issue of whether two collection letters were sent over 30 days apart so as to not overshadow. Court found the consumer was not credible, and no evidence was presented that confirmed letters were sent within 30 days or overshadowed one another.||Positive|
|Illobre v. Financial Recovery Services||District Court (NY)||November 2016||A debt collector’s validation notice also included a statement about the consumer’s right to cease communication. Court found that neither misleading nor confusing to the consumer.||Positive|
|Smith v. Convergent Outsourcing, Inc.||District Court (MI)||November 2016||Court held that the use of time-barred debt language saying that a consumer could not be sued was not misleading.||Positive|
|Robinson v. I.C. System, Inc.||District Court (NY)||November 2016||Debt settlement company called debt collector, wanting to get information about a debt. The debt settlement company did not advise the collector of authorization, and asked questions about the debt that was refused by the debt collector. The consumer sued, saying the collector failed to mark debt as disputed.||Positive|
|Mirshafiei v. Legal Recovery Law Offices, Inc||2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 143625 (C.D. Ca)||October 2016||Court found that law firm failed in its due diligence and thus violated the FDPCA when it gave process server the incorrect address for service.||Negative|
|McCray v. Fed. Home Loan Mortg. Corp||2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 18266 (4th Cir)||October 2016||Law firm who was activing as a substitute trustee for the purposes of a deed of trust was a debt collector. Even though the communications were in regard to the enforcement of a security interest, they involved a foreclosure and the payment of money.||Negative|
|Tilatitsky v. Medicredit, Inc.||2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 140493 (E.D. Mo)||October 2016||Demand letter with settlement options which provided did not violation FDCPA. Phrase in letter that says "please either" was mere speculation that consumer would be confused.||Positive|
|Vayngurt v. Southwest Credit Sys., L.P.||2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 142680 (E.D. N.Y.)||October 2016||Court concluded that the parties to the contract—T-Mobile and plaintiff—intended the collection fee to be owed at the same time as the principal and seeking those fees in a complaint was not a violation of the FDCPA.||Positive|
|Hart v. Credit Control, LLC||2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 143048 (M.D. Fl)||October 2016||Voice which identified agency but bur not a representative specifically was not a violation of 1692d(6) and voice mail was not a communication.||Positive|
|McGinty v. Prof'l Claims Bureau, Inc||2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 143627 (E.D. N.Y.)||October 2016||Debt collector failed to explicitly identify the current creditor in demand letter and thus violated 1692g||Negative|
|Vien-Phuong Thi Ho v. Recontrust Co||2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 18836 (9th Cir.)||October 2016||A trustee, who was the agent for the lender and borrower and who is authorized to sell property if debtor defaults is not a debt collector. Proceeding to a non-judicial foreclosure is not debt collection.||Positive|
|Sullivan v. Allied Interstate, LLC,||2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 145451 (W.D. Pa)||October 2016||Debt collector was under not duty to disclose that debt was time barred and using the word settlement was not a threat of litigation||Positive|
|Woerthwein v. Midland Credit Mgmt.,||2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 146624 (N.D. Il)||October 2016||Competent attorney standard only applies to a consumer's attorney and will not be applied if the consumer is an attorney||Negative|
|Henhaffer v. Simeone & Raynor||2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 148692 (D.N.J.)||October 2016||1692g notice that required consumer to state the nature of the dispute is not mandated under the act and thus was a violation of the FDCPA.||Negative|
|Myers v. Americollect Inc.||2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 136941 (E.D. Wi)||September 2016||Wi statute permits pre-judgment interest & Wi Dept of Finance confirmed that debt collector was permitted to charge interest, no FDCPA violation||Positive|
|Sulaiman v. Biehl & Biehl||2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 136677 (N.D. Il)||September 2016||Plaintiff is a consumer atty. Court refused to apply competent atty standard and found letter on its face not confusing||Positive|
|Crail v. I.C. System||2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 118868 (S.D. In)||September 2016||Dunning letter that stated interest may accrue is not false and misleading on its face||Positive|
|Willard v. Bank of Am||2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 119729 (E.D.Pa)||September 2016||Court denied Plaintiff's claimed that by securitizing the credit card receivables and selling them to Wilmington Trust, BOA relinquished its beneficial interest in the account and no debt was owed to BOA. Same case as Scott v. BOA, which was dismissed and dismissal affirmed by 3rd Circuit.||Positive|
|Caprel v. Specialized Loan Servicing, Inc||2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 120444 (N.D. Il||September 2016||Letter sent to consumer's attorney did not violation FDPCA. NO facts were alleged that attorney would be otherwise deceived or that letters were false.||Positive|
|Marquez v. Weinstein, Pinson & Riley, P.S||2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 16399 (7th Cir.)||September 2016||Circuit court reversed lower court and held that false representations can violate FDPCA even if made in pleadings. Complaint which contained 1692g language and information regarding when to respond to the summons was misleading to the least sophisticated consumer.||Negative|
|Daugherty v. Convergent Outsourcing, Inc.||2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 16531 (5th Cir)||September 2016||Circuit Court reversed lower court and found letter on time barred debt which did not threaten suit could mislead an unsophisticated consumer to believe that her time-barred debt is legally enforceable, regardless of whether litigation is threatened.||Negative|
|Linehan v. Allianceone Receivables Mgmt||2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 124276 (W.D. Wa)||September 2016||Consolidated cases involving compliance with state law choice of venue but contrary to 1692i of FDCPA. Court, siding with Suez decision in 7th Circuit found that complaints stated a claim for violation of the FDCPA. Arguments of vagueness, separation of powers, Article III standing rejected. County Court was joined as a necessary party||Negative|
|Huling v. Franklin Collection Serv.,||2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 123742 (N.D. Ga)||September 2016||Letter stating that the matter would be "pursued to a conclusion" could be interpreted by the least sophisticated consumer as a treat of legal action.||Negative|
|Lopez v. Law Offices of Faloni & Assocs.||2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 124730 (D. NJ)||September 2016||Failure to obtain appropriate license in state of NJ could state a claim under the FDPCA in that debt collector and attorney misrepresented legal status of the debt since there was no right to collect||Negative|
|Panico v. Portfolio Recovery Assocs||2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 124729 (D.NJ)||September 2016||Debt buyer applied Delaware law based upon credit card agreement. Because NJ consumer did not reside in Delaware, Delaware's tolling provisions applied, so even though complaint was filed passed 3 year SOL, tolling provision extended time and no FDCPA violation based upon NJ SOL||Positive|
|Jackson v. Abendroth & Russell,||2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 125986 (S.D. IA)||September 2016||Plaintiff failed to plead any concrete injuries when he alleged that validation letter under 1692g and state law disclosures overshadowed his rights.||Positive|
|Kane v. Prof'l Med. Mgmt.||2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 126260 (D. N.J.)||September 2016||Validation letter that asks consumer to contact debt collection does not overshadow disclosures mandated by 1692g and does not give the impression that the only way to stop collection activity is to pay.||Positive|
|Brinkley v. Midland Funding, LLC||2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 127188 (E.D. TN)||September 2016||Plaintiff proceeded on two theories of FDCPA liability; (1) that certified copy of judgment failed to state that it was from a debt collector, and Plaintiff was not served with a copy of the notice of execution. Court denied claims||Positive|
|Dennis v. Riezman Berger, P.C||2016 Mo. App. LEXIS 927 (Missouri Court fo Appeals (E.D)||September 2016||Appeals court reversed lower court decision finding that adding post-judgment interest to a consent judgment was not a violation of the FDCPA and Missouri state law. Appeals court held that post-judgment interest is not an automatic award and must be included in the judgment.||Negative|
|Haney v. Portfolio Recovery et al||2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 17287 (8th Cir)||September 2016||Circuit court found that charge-off does not waive debt buyer's ability to charge prejudgment statutory interest. However FDPCA claim stated against law firm for charging interest upon interest upon interest portion of charge off balance.||Positive|
|Annunziato v. Collecto, Inc||2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 131410 (E.D.N.Y.)||September 2016||Letter from debt collector violated FDCPA when it failed to advise that balance included contingency fees that would be due and owing to an attorney, when those fees had yet to be realized.||Negative|
|McNamee v. Debski & Assocs., P.A||2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 131912 (M.D. Fl)||September 2016||Plaintiff's complaint stated a claim against law firm for failing to notify consumer that client had agreed not to pursue post judgment interest, and then law firm changed position and sought the same interest subsequently thereafter||Negative|
|Rodriguez v. I.C. Sys||2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 133414 (E.D. N.Y.)||September 2016||Summary judgment granted to debt collector when consumer failed to produce original envelope to show that reference numbers were visible and thus in violation of 1692f(8), also even if numbers were visible, evidence shows that reference numbers did not reveal any identifying information||Positive|
|Dick v. Enhanced Recovery Co||2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 135789 (E.D. N.Y.)||September 2016||Collection letter which stated that interest and other charges were $0.00 was not false and misleading to consumer to think there could be those charges in the future.||Positive|
|Tatis v. Allied Interstate||2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 134338 (D.N.J.)||September 2016||Collection letter that used the word settlement did not have to give a time-barred disclosure||Positive|
|Ray v. McCullough Payne & Haan||2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 1763 (11th Cir)||September 2016||FDCPA venue provisions do not apply to post judgment proceedings||Positive|
|Vetrano v. CBE Grp., Inc||2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 100396 (E.D. N.Y.||July 2016||Validation letter that asks consumer to call to settle does not overshadow validation notice nor is it misleading,||Positive|
|Campbell v. Sansone Law, LLC||2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 100889 (E.D. Mo)||July 2016||Plaintiff alleges that 1692g notice included complaint was a violation of 1692e because it was not necessary. Court found that to send the notice when it was not necessary would confuse consumer.||Negative|
|Datiz v. Int'l Recovery Assocs.||2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 102695 (E.D.N.Y)||July 2016||Statements on debt collectors website are not sufficient to warrant standing to an individual consumer to allege FDPCA claims for false and misleading statements.||Negative|
|Layton v. Frontline Asset Strategies, LLC||2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 103154 (E.D. Mo)||July 2016||In Missouri, post-judgment interest is collectable in a nontort case even if the judgment did not specifically award such interest. Plaintiffs' claim that Defendants violated FDCPA because they sought interest on a default judgment that was not specifically awarded at the time of default fails.||Positive|
|Covington v. Franklin Collection Servs||2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 103601 (D. Ka)||July 2016||Collection letter advised consumer to contact their attorney if they did not intend to pay balance in full to "REGARDING OUR POTENTIAL REMEDIES, AND YOUR DEFENSES". Cout found use of those terms did not infer litigation and link was too tenuous||Positive|
|Lyon v. Bergstrom Law, Ltd||2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 103564 (E.D. Ca)||July 2016||Voice mail that did not state message was from a debt collector was a communication and a violation of 1692e(11)||Negative|
|Gomez v. Oxford Law, LLC||2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 14543 (3rd Cir)||July 2016||Violation of TCPA and the statements contained therein did not threaten litigation and were not a per se violation of the FDCPA.||Positive|
|Davis v. Hollins Law||2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 14517 (9th Cir)||July 2016||On-going communications w ith consumer did not warrant subsequent commications to say that law firm was a debt collection. Consumer was well aware and there was no violation of 1692e(11).||Positive|
|Franklin v. Parking Revenue Recovery Servs.,||2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 14737 (7th Cir)||July 2016||Parking fines are considered debts under the FDCPA because they arise from a consumer transaction||Negative|
|Owens v. LVNV Funding, LLC||2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 14706 (7th Cir)||July 2016||Filing of an out of stat proof of claim is not an FDPCA violation. Court held bankruptcy court anticipates that stale claims will be filed and declined to follow Crawford (11th Cir)||Positive|
|Neff v. Schlee & Stillman,||2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 106834 (E.D. Mi)||July 2016||By using the word "Assignee" of original creditor, law's letter did not effectively convey the name of the creditor to whom the debt is owed and thus in violation of 1692g(a)(2)||Negative|
|Holczler v. Nat'l Enter. Sys.,||2016 U.S. 109360 (E.D. N. Y.)||July 2016||Court found no reason to believe that consumer would be confused by letter that identified creditor as "Gap Visa Card" as opposed to "Gap Visa".||Positive|
|Jackson v. Blitt & Gaines, P.C||2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 15129 (7th Cir)||July 2016||Affidavit for wage garnishment to be served on employers of consumers was not legal action for purposes of FDCPA liability.||Positive|
|Anenkova v. Van Ru Credit Corp.||2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 108950 (E.D. Pa)||July 2016||Court found benign language exception for a bar code on an envelope||Positive|
|Wade v. Account Resolution Corp||2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 110630 (E. D. Mo)||July 2016||Consumer alleged that debt collector violated FDPCA when it added pre-judgment interest when entering a default judgment. Debt collector alleged case was time-barred because complaint was brought more than one year after suit was filed. However because claim was based upon action taken when default judgment was entered the claim was timely.||Negative|
|Toohey v. Portfolio Recovery Assocs., LLC,||2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 111534 (S. D. N.Y.)||July 2016||Claim brought against debt buyer based upon CFPB consent order alleging PRA did not have sufficient information to proceed in its state court matters was allowed to proceed.||Negative|
|Rosa v. Encore Receivable Mgmt||2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 112104 (D.N.J.)||July 2016||Claim that collection letter advised consumer to call if payment was already made did not overshadowing existing validation notice. Notice did not provide consumer with either or scenario.||Positive|
|Dittig v. Elevate Recoveries, LLC||2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 112991 (W.D. PA)||July 2016||Debt collector is under no duty to disclosure that debt is beyond the statute of limitation is no threat of suit. The fact that debt collector offered a settlement does not change that fact||Positive|
|Dubios v. Atlas Acquisitions LLC (In re Dubois)||2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 15682 (4th Cir)||July 2016||The filing of an out of stat proof of claim is not an FDCPA violation||Positive|
|Sayles v. Advanced Recovery Sys||2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 114718 (S.D. Ms)||July 2016||Even though plaintiff disputed debt outside validation period, debt collector's continued failure to mark debt as disputed when reporting to the CRAs, was a violation of 1692e(8)||Negative|
|Midland Funding LLC v. Thiel||2016 N.J. Super. LEXIS 118 (N. J. Superior Ct. Appellate Div)||July 2016||State court affirmed decision that a claim arising from a customer's use of a store-issued credit card and the use was strictly for the purchase of goods from the issuing retailer is subject to a 4 year statute of limitations. Further the filing of an complaint after the statute of limitations is an automatic violation of the FDCPA||Negative|
|Brooks v. Leon's Quality Adjusters,||2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 116803 (E.D. Ca)||July 2016||FDCPA claim against repossession company denied because they were not found to be a debt collector and were not indirectly collecting any debt from the consumer||Positive|
|Myers v. Americollect Inc||2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87419 (E.D. Wi)||July 2016||Consumer stated a claim against collection agency and healthcare provider for sending a collection letter to a minor which they alleged falsely stated that minor would be responsible for the debt.||Negative|
|Billups v. Certificate Holders of Popular ABS, Inc.||2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 88197 (N.D. Il)||July 2016||Court denied claim that continuing to prosecute a foreclosure action is not a discrete act and not a continuing FDCPA violation.||Positive|
|McGuire v. Credit Collection Serv. Commercial||2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87955 (D. Hi)7/7/2016||July 2016||Attempting to collect debts owed from a car accident is not covered under the FDCPA||Positive|
|Demarais v. Gurstel Chargo, P.A.||2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87692 (D. Mn)||July 2016||No FDCPA violation against law firm for dismissing action prior to trial and for inadvertently serving discovery after dismissal.||Positive|
|Johnson-Morris v. Santander Consumer USA, Inc||2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 89081 (N.D. Il)||July 2016||Convenience fee was incidental to debt and thus subject to FDCPA||Negative|
|Nelson v. Midland Credit Mgmt.||2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 12683 (8th Cir.)||July 2016||Filing an out of stat proof of claim is not a violation of the FDCPA and proof of claim in not litigation||Positive|
|Wisdom v. Wakefield & Assocs.||2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 89768 (D. Utah)||July 2016||In order to state a claim under 1692c(b) there must be evidence that a communication occurred with a 3rd party about the debt. Here letter sent to debt but opened by father was not an improper 3rd party communication||Positive|
|Cohen v. Ltd. Fin. Servs., LP||2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 91299 (D.N.J.)||July 2016||Under NJ law, debt collector has no duty to inform consumer that payment on an out-of-statute debt will restart statute of limitations||Positive|
|Cohen v. Dynamic Recovery Solutions||2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97016 (D.N.J.)||July 2016||Debt collector disclosure about statute of limitations was not deceptive and accurate, debt collector has no duty to inform consumer that payment on an out-of-statute debt. However debt collector did not provide name of owner of the debt||Positive|
|Hernandez v. Williams||2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 13242 (9th. Cir)||July 2016||Each debt collector and any subsequent debt collector must send validation notice to consumer.||Negative|
|McNorrill v. Asset Acceptance, LLC||2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 95216 (S. D. Ga)||July 2016||Although claims for the filing of a time-barred proof of claim was denied because it was not timely filed, court found that acceptance of payments from the filing of a time-barred proof of claim can state a claim under the FDCPA.||Negative|
|Layton v. Strategies||2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94987 (M.D. Mo)||July 2016||Demand for post-judgment interested is permissible in a contract case even if court did not award same and not an FDPCA violation||Positive|
|Scribner v. Works & Lentz, Inc||2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 13313 (10th Cir)||July 2016||One call to apt complex manager was not a communication under the FDCPA. Relies on Marx case||Positive|
|Tourgeman v. Collins Fin. Servs||2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97356 (S.D. Ca)||July 2016||On remand, District Court found no standing for consumer who alleges that law firm did not engage in meaningful review when consumer never received letter||Positive|
|Wood v. Midland Funding Co. LLC||2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97857 (E.D.Mi)||July 2016||Objections to Report of Magistrate sustained. Claims that statements made in motion for alternative service in state court collection actions cannot be challenged in later federal FDCPA based upon Rooker Feldman and res judicata||Positive|
|Bock v. Pressler||2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 13681 (3d Cir)||July 2016||Matter remanded back to District Court to determine whether Plaintiff has standing under Spokeo, meaningful involvement was not addressed||Positive|
|In re Robinson||2016 Bankr. LEXIS 2742 (W.B. La)||July 2016||Court held that while FDCPA and Bankruptcy do not intersect, mere filing of an out of statute proof of claim does not violate the FDCPA||Positive|
|Parham v. Seattle Serv. Bureau||2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 13734 (11th Cir)||July 2016||Subrogation debt is not a debt covered under the FDCPA||Positive|
|Langley v. Northstar Location Servs.||2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 98399 (S.D. Tx)||July 2016||Disclosure that an agreement or promise to pay a debt could restart statute of limitations, when no agreement had been made, stated a claim under the FDCPA||Negative|
|Wittman v. CB1, Inc.||2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71383 (D. Mt)||June 2016||Court found that a fee charged by a collection agency for a payment with a credit was a violation of 1692(f) and incidental to the principle obligation||Negative|
|Balon v. Enhanced Recovery Co||2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72142 (E.D. PA.)||June 2016||1099-c language in a settlement letter found to state a claim under the FDPCA because it can be read to have two meanings||Negative|
|Nyberg v. Portfolio Recovery Assocs., LLC||2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71897 (D. Or)||June 2016||Motion to dismiss/strike affirmative defenses of debt buyer granted in part especially bona fide error defense because only recited the statute and alleged no facts||Negative|
|Murray v. Revenue Mgmt. Corp. (In re Murray)||2016 Bankr. LEXIS 2195 (Bankr. D. Mass)||June 2016||In adversary proceeding, court held that debtor violated 1692e(2)(A) when used "v" in letter when no suit had been filed but did not violate 1692e(13)||Negative|
|Adams v. Pa. Higher Educ. Assistance Agency||2016 W. Va. LEXIS 443 (WV Supreme)||June 2016||State collection laws pre-empted by Federal Family Education Loan Program (FFELP). Summary judgment in favor of agency||Positive|
|Datta v. Asset Recovery Solutions, LLC||2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 74908 (N.D. Ca)||June 2016||Courts adopts benign language exception to find that bar code and reference number (not account number) seen through window envelope is not an FDCPA violation||Positive|
|Ciganek v. Portfolio Recovery Assocs., LLC||2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 74905 (N.D. CA)||June 2016||Plaintiff alleged that Declaration attached to collection complaint was false & deceptive when it stated that collection attorney was available for service of process at one of the law firm addresses, which was 150 miles away from the Courthouse and thus not an admissible declaration. Mistaken address was not material and not a violation of CA law or FDCPA.||Positive|
|Campbell v. Am. Recovery Servs||2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 74843 (C.D. Ca)||June 2016||Debt collector use of corporation after "American Express" was immaterial and no FDPCA violation||Positive|
|Genova v. Total Card,||2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 74396 (D. NJ)||June 2016||Debt collector under no duty to advise consumer that payment will restart SOL||Positive|
|Lyons v. Michael & Assocs.||2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 10363 (9th Cir.)||June 2016||Statute of limitation for FDCPA action based upon the filing of a collection lawsuit starts when consumer is served and learns of the lawsuit||Negative|
|Arias v. Gutman, Mintz, Baker & Sonnenfeldt, P.C.,||2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76524 (S.D. N.Y.)||June 2016||Plaintiff alleges collection law firm violated 1692e & 1692f for failing to release exempt funds and for objecting to the consumer's exemption. Court found that law firm followed state procedure and did not violate FDCPA because evidence that funds were exempt were not verified and law had right to object based on state law.||Positive|
|Oliva v. Blatt||2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 10780 (7th Cir)||June 2016||Circuit Court affirmed bona fide error defense of law firm that relied on established precedent regarding venue (Suez)||Positive|
|Duhart v. LRAA Collections,||2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 10807 (8th Cir)||June 2016||Creditor is not a debt collector if it uses the name of another division of the company to collect the debt||Positive|
|Lugo v. Firstsource Advantage, LLC,||2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78636 (D. NJ)||June 2016||Debt collection settlement letter sent on out of stat debt did not violate FDCPA because it did not threaten suit and was not otherwise required to tell consumer that payment would re-set statute of limitations.||Positive|
|Taylor v. First Resolution Inv. Corp||2016-Ohio-3444 (Ohio Supreme Court)||June 2016||Prayer for an interest rate in a pleading without means to prove is actionable under the FDPCA. Also, using Ohio borrowing statute, cause of action on defaulted credit card account occurs in jurisdiction where the debt was to be paid, so that jurisdiction's SOL applies. In this case law suit was filed passed SOL.||Negative|
|LaPointe v. Midland Funding, LLC||2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 80083 (E.D. TN)||June 2016||Court drastically reduced attorney’s fees due Plaintiff's attorneys due to them being excessive and unreasonable as well as reduced their market rate||Positive|
|Williams v. Experian Info. Solutions, Inc.||2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 80383 (D. NJ)||June 2016||Court found that Plaintiff's attorney brought a frivolous claim and that meaningful involvement should is a two-way street and the attorney showed none here.||Positive|
|Gomez v. Niemann & Heyer||2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82443 (W.D. Tx)||June 2016||Failure to itemize the amount due in an initial demand letter can state a claim under the FDCPA||Negative|
|Leet v. Hosp. Serv. Dist. No. 1 of E. Baton Rouge Parish||2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82260 (M.D.La)||June 2016||Entity servicing a lien that was not in default was not a debt collector||Positive|
|Frost v. Resurgent Capital Servs., L.P.||2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 83317 (N.D.Ca)||June 2016||Court affirm debt buyers right to charge interest both by contract and state law. Court rejected that right to charge interest was waived at charge off||Positive|
|Cruz v. Fin. Recoveries||2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 83576 (D. NJ)||June 2016||Letter suggest that consumer contact debt collection about potential insurance did not overshadow 1692g disclosures because it made no mention about disputing the debt||Positive|
|Moore v. Ocwen Loan Servicing,||2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 83400 (E. D. Mi)||June 2016||Court reaffirms that debt collector has no obligation to verify a debt if a consumer sends a request for validation past the 30 day time period||Positive|
|Romeo v. Fma Alliance,||2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86148 (E.D. N.Y.)||June 2016||Consumer lacked standing when failed to disclose FDCPA claim in bankruptcy schedules||Positive|
|Rivero v. ACB Receivables Mgmt.||2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72871 (E.D. N.Y.)||May 2016||Court held that FDCPA does not specifically mandate how debtor can notify debt collector of a dispute||Positive|
|Smith v. Discover Bank||2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61450 (E.D.Ky)||May 2016||Credit card statements reprinted for state court collection action with wrong address was immaterial and did not rise to a violation of FDCPA||Positive|
|Magee v. Portfolio Recovery Assocs.,||2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61389 (N.D.Il)||May 2016||Statements of "offers to settle" on time barred debt were misleading without disclosure that debt was time-barred||Negative|
|Lindblom v. Santander Consumer USA, Inc||2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61960 (E.D. Ca)||May 2016||Plaintiff stated a claim that a convenience fee charged by payment processor (SpeedPay) on behalf of bank stated a claim under 1692f(1). However if upon discovery it is learned that bank did not collect and portion of that fee, then claim fails.||Negative|
|Montgomery v. Trident Asset Mgmt., L.L.C.,||2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62672 (D. N.J.)||May 2016||Two collection letters send 11 days apart both with validation notices did not violate FDCPA. Court found no overshadowing an no confusion on the consumer's part. Cites to NY case which says and "[n]othing in the FDCPA prohibits a debt collector from giving a debtor more than the requisite 30-day validation period".||Positive|
|Garcia v. Fry,||2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62602 (D. Ct)||May 2016||Defendant was a state process server who faxed garnishment info to out of state company. Court found he was a state officer exempt under the FDPCA even though sending the fax was a violation of state law||Positive|
|Sheriff v. Gillie||2016 U.S. LEXIS 3050 (U.S. Supreme)||May 2016||Law hired by state AG was a state officer and thus had exempt status under the FDPCA. Court found letter was not false and deceptive when it accurately portrayed law firm and AG relationship.||Positive|
|Ramirez v. Morgan & Assocs., PC||2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64672 (D. Ks)||May 2016||Complaint stated a claim alleging that letter to credit which was passed to law firm was actual knowledge that consumer was represented by counsel.||Negative|
|Lee v. Pep Boys||2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64320 (N.D. Ca)||May 2016||Although theft of services and tortious interference claims are not debts under the FDCPA letters seeking collection could be attempts to collects debts based upon a consensual transaction and thus a question of fact||Negative|
|Mintz v. Transworld Sys||2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 65103 (E.D. N.Y. )||May 2016||Consumer's failure to advise bankruptcy trustee of FDCPA claim, results in lack of standing to bring later FDCPA claim||Positive|
|Conteh v. Shamrock Cmty. Ass'n,||2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 9154 (4th Cir)||May 2016||Filing of a law suit is not deemed harassment under the FDCPA||Positive|
|St. John v. Cash||2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 9117 (7th Cir.)||May 2016||No FDCPA claim for the filing of a lawsuit that is later dismissed or does not otherwise proceed to trial||Positive|
|Wilson v. Receivables Performance Mgmt., LLC||2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 66363 (N.D. Il)||May 2016||Despite consumer's deposition testimony that she had not yet retained an attorney, law firm sent letter on same day to debt collector that it was representing consumer. Therefore communications to consumer thereafter violated FDPCA||Negative|
|Johnson v. Midland Funding, LLC||2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 9478 (11th cir)||May 2016||Filing of Out-of Stat proof of claim is a violation of FDCPA. FDCPA and Bankruptcy code can co-exist and FDCPA is not precluded by the Bankruptcy Code.||Negative|
|Muller v. Midland Funding||2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68939 (W.D. Mo)||May 2016||Misstatement of less than $1.00 on subsequent collection letters could be material and could state a claim under the FDCPA.||Negative|
|Daubert v. NRA GROUP, LLC||2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 69630 (M.D. Pa)||May 2016||Court held that a barcode is capable of identifying debtor and account number and genuine issue of material fact exists and FDCPA claims proceed to trial.||Negative|
|Velez v. Enhanced Recovery Co||2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57832 (E.D. Pa)||May 2016||Letter which stated 1099 language seeking to recover a $697.20 debt was misleading and least sophisticated consumer could believe that failure that a certain amount had to be paid in order to avoid IRS reporting and that there could be adverse consequences for settling a debt.||Negative|
|Foster v. AllianceOne Receivables Mgmt||2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 56958 (N. D. Il)||April 2016||Letter which stated "[p]lease be advised that any settlement which waives $600.00 or more in principal of a debt may be reported to the Internal Revenue Service by our client" stated a claim under FDCPA. Court found it is plausible that mention of the IRS in a situation where there is no set of circumstances in which the IRS would be involved could mislead "a person of modest education and limited commercial savvy."||Negative|
|Anarion Invs. v. Carrington Mortg. Servs||2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45444 (M.D. TN)||April 2016||In a foreclosure action, creditor who was assigned interest in real property of the consumer, brought FDCPA claims against lender in foreclosure action. Court held did not have standing and was not "any person" under 1692k. Although a foreclosure case, interested analysis of who can assert FDCPA claims.||Positive|
|Butler v. J.R.S-I, Inc.||2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45256 (N.D. IL)||April 2016||Court allowed equitable tolling of statute of limitations for FDCPA claims where consumer did not learn of the collection action because she was not served with a complaint||Negative|
|Casso v. LVNV Funding LLC||2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 46331 (N.D. IL)||April 2016||Plaintiff alleges debt buyer affidavit in support of litigation which stated that is accessed and reviewed "business records" as fraudulent it implied it contained full details of the debt which could be proven at trial. Court disagreed as affidavit made no such representations and no evidence that least sophisticated consumer would be misled by terms "business records". Court also rejected claims that CFPB consent orders were dispositive that affidavit were false and misleading.||Positive|
|Janetos v. Fulton Friedman & Gullace, LLP||2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 6361 (7th Cir)||April 2016||Circuit court reversed decision of District Court that failure to identify current credit in its 1692g was material and that additional evidence of confusion was required.||Negative|
|United States v. Commer. Recovery Sys.||2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 46867 (E.D. TX)||April 2016||Summary Judgment in favor of FTC for claims against collection agency for violation of FDCPA for impersonating attorneys and threatening arrest||Negative|
|Wittman v. Cb1, Inc.||2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 47792 (D. MT)||April 2016||Agency which charged a transaction fee for certain payment methods can be considered incidental to the principal obligation and thus fall within the FDCPA. Complaint states a claim||Negative|
|Bloodworth v. United Credit Serv||2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 49129 (D. WI)||April 2016||Use of the word "will consider other methods of enforcing collection" constitutes a threat and stated a claim under FDCPA||Negative|
|Blanchard v. N. Am. Credit Servs.||2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 48548 (S. D. Il)||April 2016||"We want to offer you the chance to pay what you owe voluntarily...," is not a threat of litigation and advising consumer to go to website to dispute debt is not a violation of 1692g and satisfies writing requirement||Positive|
|In re White||2016 Bankr. LEXIS 1386 (E.D. N.C. (Bnk)||April 2016||Filing of out-of-stat proof of claim is not an FDPCA violation and no sanctions awarded||Positive|
|Carmichael v. Pressler & Pressler, LLP||2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 6902 (3d. Cir)||April 2016||NJ resident employed in PA is subject to wage garnishment, and subject to out of state judgment. Executing wages was not an FDPCA violation.||Positive|
|Rainey v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp.||2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53650 (E.D. MI)||April 2016||Defendant was not a debt collector because it was a guarantee agency under HEA and owed a fiduciary obligation to DOE and thus no claim under 1692a(6)||Positive|
|Filgueiras v. Portfolio Recovery Assocs||2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 54672 (D. NJ)||April 2016||District Court found that offers to "settle" a time-barred debt implies that the debt is legally enforceable, following McMahon & Buchanon and distinguishing Huertas because it did not involve a settlement letter||Negative|
|HBLC, Inc. v. Egan||2016 IL App (1st) 143922 (1st District Court of Appeals)||March 2016||State Appellate Court reverses dismissal of Debtor's counter claim alleging violation of FDCPA for filing of time-barred lawsuit. FDCPA applies to pleadings and the filing of a lawsuit||Negative|
|Boldon v. Riverwalk Holdings||2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30392 ( D.Mn)||March 2016||Lawsuit filed in one county and then refiled in another county was a "new communications" and thus 2nd suit was not barred by 1 year SOL of the FDCPA||Negative|
|Jarrett v. LVNV Funding||2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29866 (W. D. Ky)||March 2016||Plaintiff's failure to list FDCPA claim on bankruptcy schedules is judicially estopped from bring FDCPA claim .||Positive|
|Goldenstein v. Repossessors Inc.||2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 4447 (3d Cir)||March 2016||No FDCPA claim and right to repossess vehicle existed even if loan rate is usurious. However repossession of a vehicle could be considered the "collection of unlawful debt" for RICO purposes and state law claims||Positive|
|Webb v. Law Office of Ira T. Nevel, LLC||2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32018 (N.D. Il)||March 2016||Including FDCPA notice in a foreclosure complaint implicates all requirements of FDCPA, and Plaintiff stated a claim against foreclosure law firm for failing to provide the correct amount of the debt||Negative|
|Sambel Props., LLC v. Baker,||2016 Vt. Super. LEXIS 2||March 2016||Violation of the FDCPA cannot be used as a defense in an eviction action.||Positive|
|Davis v. Phelan Hallinan & Diamond, P.C.||2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35431 (D. NJ)||March 2016||Undelivered debt collection letters do not constitute "communications" that violate the FDCPA||Positive|
|Dalley v. Mitchell Rubenstein & Assocs., P.C||2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35057 (DC. Dist)||March 2016||Conusmer lacked standing because FDCPA claim was part of bankruptcy estate||Positive|
|Stratton v. PRA||2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35773 (D. Ky)||March 2016||Creditors' charge off of account was not deemed a waiver to charge interest by a debt buyer . Business records admissible for SJ purposes.||Positive|
|Avila v. Riexinger & Assocs., LLC||2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 5327 (2nd Cir)||March 2016||Section 1692e of the FDCPA requires debt collectors, when they notify consumers of their account balance, to disclose that the balance may increase due to interest and fees. However 2nd Cir adopted 7th Cir safe harbor language||Negative|
|Avila v. Riexinger & Assocs., LLC||2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 5183 (2nd Cir)||March 2016||Appellant court affirmed dismissal of remaining claims including dismissal of meaningful invovlement claim when there was already a Grecco disclaimer||Positive|
|Messick v. Messerli & Kramer,||2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 39615 (D. MN)||March 2016||Attempts to contact debtor to get correct atty info when debtor advised she was represented was not an FDCPA violation.||Positive|
|Schwarz v. Portfolio Recovery Assocs.,||2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 39169 (M.D. FL)||March 2016||Subsequent letters which made settlement offers were not exceptions to 1692c(c)(2) after consumer requested debt collector to cease collections efforts||Negative|
|Bishop v. Ross Earle & Bonan, P.A||2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 5594 (2nd Cir.)||March 2016||11th Circuit held that communication to an attorney fail with FDPCA and attorney required to comply with 1692g and include "in-writing requirement".||Negative|
|Grunwald v. Midland Funding LLC & Messerli & Kramer||2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40769 (D. MN)||March 2016||Letter which included process server fee which had not yet incurred was not a material misrepresentation and thus not a violation of the FDCPA||Positive|
|In re FDCPA Cognate Cases. Steven J. Verburg et al||2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44039 (W.D. MI)||March 2016||Consolidated matter involving numerous state court matters in Michigan. Court's construction of the Michigan garnishment rule, and the FDCPA, found that claimed costs in the requests and writs for garnishment were improper and violated the FDCPA.||Negative|
|Credit Bureau v. Todor (In re Todor)||2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 41083 (D. Or)||March 2016||Failure to include "Inc" in a small claims complaint was not material misrepresentation and not an FDCPA violation||Positive|
|Betz v. First Credit Servs.||2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40956 (D. D.C.)||March 2016||Stating that "this office will assume the debt to be valid" in a 1692g notice is not a significiant deviation from the statute and not a violation of the FDPCA||Positive|
|Hageman v. Barton||2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 5746 (8th Cir)||March 2016||Pleadings submitted to the court showed that law firm was not permitted by the terms of the assignment to bring suit in the name of the creditor||Negative|
|Vance v. Portfolio Recovery Assocs., LLC||2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 41969 (N.D. Il)||March 2016||Failure of debt collector to proceed with its collection action in court is not basis for an FDCPA action.||Positive|
|Miles v. Retrieval-Masters Creditor's Bureau, Inc.||2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 41902 (E. D. N. Y.)||March 2016||Use of the term "other accounts" is not misleading, no requirement of a complete break down of the debt||Positive|
|Bledsoe v. Prof'l Fin. Co||2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 41832 (W. D. MO)||March 2016||District Court declined "safe harbor" lanaguage regarding possible accural of interest||Negative|
|Moukengeschaie v. Eltman||2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43725 (E.D. N.Y. )||March 2016||Collection Letter which stated that law firm has been instructed to find any assets to collect on the judgment and that non-exempt assets would be seized could state a claim if law firm was not given instructions by client to do so||Negative|
|Schraven v. Phelan Hallinan Diamond & Jones||District Court (PA)||February 2016||In action where proper default judgement entered and property went to foreclosure, consumers barred under Rooker Feldman from bringing FDPCA action for unauthorized attorney’s fees||Positive|
|Beliz v. Loan Simple||District Court (CO)||February 2016||Consumer filed bankruptcy while in foreclosure, but failed to state claims against servicers for FDCPA violations. Motion to dismiss granted because consumer lost authority to pursue FDCPA claims||Positive|
|Gray v. Suttell & Assocs., P.S||District Court (WA)||February 2016||Debt buyer, as well as its servicer, can be considered a collection agency under Wash St. licensing act.||Negative|
|Hoch v. Mid-Minnesota Mgmt. Servs||District Court (MN)||February 2016||Voluntary payments of a bill by ex-spouse does not create obligation to pursue delinquent account upon that ex-spouse, especially when credit application does not show ex-spouse as responsible party. FDCPA violation sustained||Negative|
|Heling v. Creditors Collection Serv.,||District Court (WI)||February 2016||Rooker-Feldman defenses denied. Court adopting 7th circuit analysis that allegations that claims might relate to a state court judgment and challenge debt collector's efforts to collect are not barred by Rooker Feldman||Negative|
|Zeehlu Yang v. Midland Credit Mgmt||District Court (KS)||February 2016||Debt collector sent letter on out of stat debt asking for payment in full, but advised no intend to sue. Court found that debt collector had duty to inform account was out of stat and that partial payment would revive the debt.||Negative|
|Schuller v. AllianceOne Receivables Management Inc.||District Court (MO)||February 2016||Debt collectors instruction to make a payment or arrange a payment plan during the validation period was confusing as debtor would not know that they could still dispute the debt.||Negative|
|Joslin v. Fair Collections & Outsourcing, Inc.||District Court (MO)||February 2016||State specific disclosures that are not clearly labeled on a letter can confuse the least sophisticated consumer||Negative|
|Bravo v. Midland Credit Mgmt||U.S. 7th Circuit||February 2016||7th Circuit affirmed District Court holding that letter addressed to consumer but sent to attorney is not a violation of FDCPA and 1692c(a)(2), thwarts FDPCA objective for debt collectors to freely communicate with counsel.||Positive|
|Hamburger v. Northland Grp., Inc||District Court (PA)||February 2016||After jury verdict in favor of Defendants and evidence that Plaintiff falsified evidence and had no good faith basis to bring suit, claims for attorneys fees and costs under 1692k(a)(3) denied||Negative|
|Scarola Malone & Zubatov LLP v. McCarthy, Burgess & Wolff||U.S. 2nd Circuit||February 2016||2nd Circuit affirmed plain language of FDCPA that true nature of the debt determines whether it is covered under the act, rather than actions of the debt collector.||Positive|
|Daniel v. Select Portfolio Servicing, LLC||District Court (FL)||February 2016||Plaintiff stated a FDCPA claim under §1692f(1) where servicer marked up property inspection charge by $1.50.||Negative|
|Schlaf v. Safeguard Props., LLC||District Court (IL)||February 2016||Vendor hired by mortgage servicing company to leave note to for debtors to contact bank considered a debt collector||Negative|
|Simon v. Fia Card Servs. Na||U.S. 3rd Circuit||February 2016||3rd Circuit affirmed that false representation that subpoena was mailed to the consumer was not material, and non-compliance with Rule 45 also did not violate FDPCA because it was sent to the attorney, who would not otherwise been deceived.||Positive|
|Andino v. Mercantile Adjustment Bureau, LLC,||District Court (NY)||February 2016||Plaintiff did not stand in the shoes of deceased debtor and therefore was not a consumer for 1692g(a) purposes.||Positive|
|Portalatin v. Blatt, Hasenmiller, Leibsker & Moore, LLC||District Court (IL)||February 2016||Consumer sued debt buyer and law firm under FDPCA for filing in wrong venue. Consumer only sought actual damages. Debt buyer settled for more than statutory minimum. Law firm lost at trial but argued that judgment should be amended because Plaintiff by its settlement with debt buyer got all that was allowed under the FDCPA. Court disagreed.||Negative|
|Gallego v. Northland Group Inc.||U.S. 2nd Circuit||February 2016||Court found that allegations of collection letter which provided call back number but did not specify name of person at the number did not state an FDCPA claim but claim was not so insubstantial that it did not support federal-question jurisdiction. Calls cert denied but case remanded for further proceedings||Negative/Positive|
|Bedrosian v. State Collection Serv.||District Court (MO)||February 2016||Debt collection response to consumer question about a garnishment did not state a claim under the FDCPA||Positive|
|Dall v. Constantino,||District Court (UT)||February 2016||Rooker-Feldman Doctrine precluded consumer from FDCPA claim on a default judgment entered 8 years prior||Positive|
|Diaz v. First Marblehead Corp||U.S. 11th Circuit||February 2016||2nd Cir affirmed award of attorney’s fees under 1602k(a)(3) against consumer whose attorney filed numerous FDCPA cases against servicers knowing they were not debt collectors||Positive|
|Reynolds v. CollectionCenter, Inc.,||District Court (CO)||February 2016||Summary Judgment granted to law firm for bona fide error defense. Court found law firm had reasonable procedures that were being used an implemented to present law suits against the wrong person and that law firm had right to reasonably rely on information from their client.||Positive|
|Bowles v. Receivables Performance Mgmt., LLC,||District Court (IL)||February 2016||Arbitration clause upheld for collection agency who was assigned the debt.||Positive|
|Gorman v. Messerli & Kramer, P.A.||District Court (MN)||February 2016||Adding process server costs in a dunning letter was not "permitted by law" under 1692f"||Negative|
|Kinlock v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A||U.S. 11th Circuit||February 2016||Borrower's FDCPA claims against a lender failed because the lender's letter to the borrower after foreclosure offering to provide him funds if he would vacate the property by various dates was not a demand for payment.||Positive|
|Samms v. Abrams||District Court (NY)||February 2016||Lawsuit served in county where debtor lives but filed in another county does not violate venue provision of 1692(i)||Positive|
|Judd v. Credit Control||District Court (MO)||January 2016||Missouri court held that subsuquent debt collector that was acquired by previous debt collection does not have to send 1692g disclosure||Positive|
|Todd v. United States Bank||District Court (PA)||January 2016||Rocker-Feldman doctrine applies and challenges to costs, fees and interest on a default judgment and writ of execution should have been challenged in state court.||Positive|
|Halberstam v. Global Credit & Collection Corp||District Court (NY)||January 2016||Telephone call to debtor answered by a third party, where name and number was left (but no ID that debt collector) was a communication under the FDCPA because it induced consumer to contact debt collector. Summary judgment granted in consumer's favor||Negative|
|Youssofi v. Allied Interstate LLC||District Court (CA)||January 2016||Court struck all affirmative defenses of a FDCPA claim becaused they failed as a matter of law||Negative|
|In re Glenn||District Court (IL)||January 2016||Court rejected Crawford analysis, filing of POC on time-barred debt is not nor can it be an FDCPA violation||Positive|
|Garfield v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC||U.S. 2nd Circuit||January 2016||Collection of debt after discharge is a FDPCA violation and not precluded by bankruptcy injunction||Negative|
|Castellanos v. Midland Funding LLC & Am. Infosource LP||District Court (FL)||January 2016||FDCPA claim precluded; filing out of stat proof of claim||Positive|
|Zirogiannis v. Nat'l Recovery Agency||District Court (NY)||December 2015||Timing of disputes, miailbox rule, but letetrs violated FDCPA regardless||Negative|
|Powers v. Kearns||District Court (NY)||December 2015||Determination of whether debt was personal or commercial, "Intended purpose", "end use" and "nature of transaction" are the focus||Positive|
|Bridges v. Performant Recovery, Inc.||District Court (GA)||December 2015||2nd collection letter did not overshadow validation notice||Positive|
|Lake v. Consumer Adjustment||District Court (MO)||December 2015||1692f(8) claims denied, followed 8th Circuit in Stand||Positive|
|Kline v. MERS & Reimer, Lorber & Arnovitz et al||District Court (OH)||December 2015||Statute of limitation for 1692f(1) is specifically defined based upon the actual collection of a debt.||Negative|
|Berry v. ARS||District Court (PA)||December 2015||1692f(8) - bar code on envelope, benigh argument rejected, strict and narrow reading of statute||Negative|
|Palmer v. Credit Collection Servs.||District Court (PA)||December 2015||1692(f) read narrowily and strictly and forbids QRQ codes, benigh argument rejected||Negative|
|Bauman v. Bank of America||U.S. 5th Circuit||December 2015||A debt collection foreclosure action is not a compulsory counterclaim in an FDCPA lawsuit||Positive|
|Psaros v. Green Tree Servicing LLC||District Court (NJ)||December 2015||Incorrect amount on state court form for foreclosure purposes a pleading subject to FDPCA||Negative|
|Dorman v. Computer Credit Inc.||District Court (NJ)||December 2015||Envelope case, alpha numeric sequence||Negative|
|Oberg v. Blatt, Hasenmiller, Leibsker & Moore, LLC||District (IL)||December 2015||In settlement negotiations law firm sought repayment of court costs before judgment entered, court found consumer not obligated to pay and vioaltion of §1692(e) & (f)||Negative|
|Mavroff v. Kohn||District Court (WI)||December 2015||Mailing a copy of a pleading to consumer's counsel is not a violation of the FDCPA||Positive|
|Himmelein v. Fed. Home Loan Mortg. Corp & Trott & Trott||District Court (MI)||December 2015||Debt is extinquished upon foreclosure. Efforts to collect payment post sale are not considered debt collection activity under the FDCPA.||Positive|
|McShann v. Northland Group||District Court (MO)||December 2015||Envelope case - internal account number visible was benign||Positive|
|PRA v. Mejia||Missouri 16th Circuit||November 2015||Upheld $82 million punative damage award||Negative|
|Alvarado v. Northland Group, Inc.||District Court (MO)||November 2015||Envelope case - internal account number visible was benign||Positive|
|Schendzielos v. Silverman, et al||Distict Court (CO)||October 2015||Legal pleadings as communications: Alleged false & misleading statements in legal pleadings||Negative|
|Ehrich v. Convergent Outsourcing, Inc.||District Court (FL)||October 2015||Settlement letter, time barred debt||Positive|
|Brown v. Van Ru Credit Corporation||U.S. 6th Circuit||October 2015||Voicemail message||Positive|
|Bien v. Stellar Recovery||District Court (RI)||September 2015||Caller ID, "spoofing", use of local number||Positive|
|Adkins v. Financial Recovery Services, Inc.||District Court (IL)||September 2015||Third party disclosure (account number seen through an envelope window)||Negative|
|Pardo v. Allied Interstate, LLC||District Court (IN)||September 2015||Failure to identify name of creditor to whom debt is owed||Negative|
|Horowitz v. GC Services||District Court (CA)||April 2015||Caller ID, "spoofing", use of local number||Negative|
|Donaldson v. LVNV Funding, LLC||District Court (PA)||April 2015||Two Positive Decisions for the Industry Regarding Chapter 13 Cases||Positive|
|Torres v. Cavalry SPV I, LLC||District Court (PA)||April 2015||Two Positive Decisions for the Industry Regarding Chapter 13 Cases||Positive|
|Isaac v. RMB, Inc.||U.S. 11th Circuit (unpublished)||March 2015||Bona fide error re: cease and desist letter||Positive|
|Covert v. LVNV Funding||U.S. 4th Circuit||March 2015||Filing a proof of claim in bankruptcy||Positive|
|Huebner v. Midland Credit Management||District Court (NY)||February 2015||Consumer "baiting" FDCPA violations||Positive|
|Monique Sykes et al., vs. Mel Harris & Associates||U.S. 2nd Circuit||February 2015||"Sewer service" of collection lawsuit papers||Negative|
|Nicaisse v. Stephens & Michael Assocs.||District Court (NY)||February 2015||FDCPA liablity for calls left on ansewring machine heard by 3rd parties||Negative|
|Buchanan v. Northland Group||U.S. 6th Circuit||January 2015||Settlement offer on time-barred debt||Negative|
|Powell v. Palisades Acquisition XI||U.S. 4th Circuit||December 2014||Error in Assignment of Judgment; Legal filings under the FDCPA||Negative|
|Zweigenhaft v. Receivables Performance Management||District Court (NY)||November 2014||Third party disclosure||Positive|
|Hagler v. Credit World Services, Inc.||District Court (KS)||October 2014||What constitutes a "communication"||Positive|
|Russell v. Absolute Collection Services||U.S. 4th Circuit||September 2014||Defining a dispute and account inaccuracy||Negative|
|Douglass v. Convergent Outsourcing||U.S. 3rd Circuit||August 2014||Third party disclosure (through an envelope window)||Negative|
|Haddad v. Alexander, Zelmanski, Danner & Fioritto||U.S. 6th Circuit||July 2014||Debt verification requirements||Negative|
|Crawford v. LVNV Funding, LLC||U.S. 11th Circuit||July 2014||Filing proof of claim on time-barred debt||Negative|
|Wallace v. Diversified Consultants, Inc.||U.S. 6th Circuit||March 2014||Language used in collection letters - validation notice||Positive|
|McMahon v. LVNV Funding||U.S. 7th Circuit||March 2014||Failure to disclose time-barred debt in settlement offer||Negative|
|Clark et al. v. Absolute Collection Service||U.S. 4th Circuit||January 2014||Language used in collection letters - validation notice||Negative|
|Gruber v. Creditors' Protection Service||U.S. 7th Circuit||January 2014||Language used in collection letters - validation notice||Positive|
|Bradley v. Franklin Collection Service||U.S. 11th Circuit||January 2014||Collection fees based on percentage of balance||Negative|
|Vincent v. The Money Store||U.S. 2nd Circuit||November 2013||Defining a creditor as "debt collector" under FDCPA||Negative|
|Schlegel v. Wells Fargo Bank||U.S. 9th Circuit||July 2013||Defining a creditor as "debt collector" under FDCPA||Positive|
|Marx v. General Revenue Corp||U.S. Supreme Court||February 2013||Cost recovery in successful defenses||Positive|
|Caprio v. Healthcare Revenue Recovery Group||U.S. 3rd Circuit||March 2013||Language used in collection letters||Negative|
|Glazer v. Chase Home Finance||U.S. 6th Circuit||January 2013||Debt collection in home foreclosures||Negative|
|Marx v. General Revenue Corp||U.S. 10th Circuit||December 2011||What constitutes a "communication"||Positive|
|Jerman v. Carlisle||U.S. Supreme Court||April 2010||Bona fide error defenses||Negative|
|Foti v. NCO Financial Systems||Southern District of New York||March 2006||Pre-recorded and answering machine messages||Negative|
Other Important FDCPA Documents
Not all FDCPA investigations launched by the FTC result in an enforcement action or settlement. Often, the FTC finds no actionable violations. In these cases, the regulator will issue a closing letter explaining to the company and the public why it did not pursue legal action.
The CFPB recently joined the FFTC in an amicus brief filed on behalf of a plaintiff in an FDCPA case (Delgado v. Capital Management Services) before a federal appeals court. The case concerns language used in collection letters sent on time-barred accounts. The two regulators then followed up with another amicus brief in a very similar case on language used to communicate with consumers with a time-barred account.